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ABSTRACT 
Operational contract support activities during stability and reconstruction operations rely 
significantly on local national contractors to provide goods and services for U.S. forces. 
In some cases, local national contractors are given priority in competition for contracts as 
a means of stimulating and rebuilding the local economy. A major risk associated with 
using local national contractors in contingency environments is the presence of business 
entities that may directly or indirectly support adversarial forces. Entering into contracts 
with enemy-affiliated business entities creates significant contractual and security risk for 
U.S. forces.  
Mitigating the effects of enemy-affiliated business must be a priority for 
contingency contracting officers. However, the process of preventing enemy-affiliated 
business entities from contracting with the U.S. government is complex and difficult to 
navigate. In this MBA Report, we analyze the reasons for this complexity and provide 
future policy recommendations to better counteract the contracting-with-the-enemy 
phenomenon. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Defense (DOD) has increasingly relied on contractors for a 
critical array of support functions in contingency environments. This trend is evident in 
the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In March 2013, the number of contractors in 
Afghanistan exceeded the number of troops by more than 40,000 people (Schwartz & 
Church, 2013). This reliance on operational contract support (OCS) has created greater 
economies of force for joint force commanders (JFCs) as a greater percentage of the 
troops deployed to contingency environments can be used in direct combat or combat 
support roles. As operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan transitioned toward stability 
and reconstruction efforts, OCS was used as a tool to stimulate those countries’ host 
nation economies. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2008 provided 
language allowing DOD contracting officers to limit competition and created a 
preference for goods and services from Iraq and Afghanistan (Public Law 110-181, § 
886, 2008). While noble in its intent, the public law increased reliance on contractors and 
preference for goods and services sourced from host nation contractors, which has 
unintentionally increased the DOD’s risk of entering into contracts with enemy business 
entities. 
The risk of contracting with enemy business entities is not a new one. The 
government first struggled with the problem during the reconstruction period following 
the Civil War (James Filor et al. v. The United States, 1867). More recently, the problem 
of contracting with the enemy in Afghanistan was brought to light by a congressional 
investigation into the Host Nation Trucking (HNT) contract. The HNT contract was a 
$2.16 billion contract to transport supplies to U.S. military installations throughout the 
country. Upon investigation, it was determined that the trucking companies contracted to 
provide logistical support were also providing protection payments to Taliban 
commanders (Tierney, 2010). The U.S. government was inadvertently helping the 
Taliban by funding its operations and potentially providing them access to U.S. 
infrastructure. The United States’ potential to contract with the enemy is not a new one, 
nor should it be considered specific to one particular conflict theater.  
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In response to the dangers of contracting with the enemy, Congress included a 
policy rider in the 2012 NDAA aimed at prohibiting the award of contracts to enemy 
persons or entities (Public Law 112-81, 2011, § 841). The law required the commander of 
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to identify contractors affiliated with the enemy. 
The CENTCOM list of enemy-affiliated contractors is then forwarded to the Head of 
Contracting Activity (HCA) for action in the form of restriction of award or termination 
for default of existing contracts with enemy-affiliated businesses. This system, known as 
vendor vetting, has been used to identify business entities operating in Afghanistan that 
directory or indirectly support enemy operations. Unfortunately, the law has not been 
sufficient to prevent enemy entities from contracting with the U.S. government. The 
legislation’s limitations were first reported in a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
(SIGAR) report in 2013. That report concluded that the DOD could not provide 
reasonable assurance that their implementation of Section 841 successfully prevented 
contracting with the enemy (SIGAR, 2013). One problem with the implementation of 
Section 841 guidance is the Army’s reluctance to refer enemy-affiliated contractors for 
suspension and disbarment (McHugh, 2013). Instead, the Army is relying on the 
individual contracting officer to make prudent decisions to preclude enemy businesses 
from competition. 
The ultimate responsibility for preventing the award to and terminating existing 
contracts with enemy-affiliated businesses rests with the contracting officer. The 
contracting officer has the authority to make responsibility determinations of prospective 
contractors and execute current contract terminations. The contracting officer must 
prudently apply these tools. In 2013, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (COFC) heard a 
case in which the plaintiff sued the government for creating a scenario that resulted in de 
facto debarment for companies identified as affiliated with the enemy in accordance with 
Section 841 (MG Altus Apache Company v. United States, 2013). Altogether, the 
combination of laws, policies, and court cases creates a difficult environment for 
contingency contracting officers to navigate. This environment’s complexity is 
exacerbated by the inherent conflict between the need to make a military decision to 
prevent enemy businesses from competing for contracts and traditional government 
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acquisition policies that tend to favor full and open competition to the maximum extent 
possible. Ultimately, the contracting officer is faced with a dilemma in which he or she 
must carefully navigate between just and competing policy initiatives.  
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this research is to alleviate the burdensome process created by the 
contracting officer’s dilemma. We accomplish this by first examining and identifying the 
tools available to contracting officers to prevent enemy business entities from competing 
for contracts. Then, we identify specific policy recommendations that have the potential 
to eliminate the contracting officer’s dilemma by mitigating the discretionary factors 
associated with the decision to prevent an enemy-identified business from competition. 
The end state of this paper is for readers to be aware of the problem, equipped with the 
knowledge to mitigate its severity, and educated on policy alternatives that have the 
potential to alleviate contracting with the enemy. 
We crafted the following research questions to help guide our study of contracting 
with the enemy: 
• How can standard contracting processes like those authorized by the FAR
be used by contracting officers to prevent contracting with the enemy?
• How do the evidentiary standards and burdens of proof required to prevent
an enemy-affiliated contractor from competing for a contract compare
with the standards typically associated with enemy status determinations,
including lethal targeting?
• What conflicts are created when contracting officers use standard
contracting processes to exclude sources from competition in order to
achieve the military goal of preventing enemy businesses from competing
for contract award?
This research paper focuses primarily on the challenges of preventing contracting 
with the enemy through the lens of the contingency contracting officer.   
B. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
The results of this research can be used to educate contingency contracting 
officers (CCOs) on the challenges of preventing contracting with the enemy. This report 
creates greater awareness of the threat posed by enemy business entities and educates 
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CCOs on the specific tools available to them to mitigate the threat. Additionally, this 
report can be used by policy makers to develop future policies that can further mitigate 
the threat. 
This research is limited by the availability of unclassified and publicly releasable 
information available on the topic. Specific information regarding the vendor vetting 
program and how it is used to identify enemy businesses is classified and not publically 
releasable. Additionally, the COFC issued decisions on cases pertinent to the vendor 
vetting program that were originally issued as classified decisions and, only upon 
significant redaction, were issued to the public. Our research only reviews publically 
releasable and unclassified material. 
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
We conducted a thorough content analysis of all available and pertinent literature 
regarding the topic of contracting with the enemy. More specifically, we studied reports 
from government agencies, established laws and regulations, and court-issued decisions 
and interpretations on the subject. This study has helped us identify commonalities, 
disagreements, and gaps in knowledge that enabled us to answer our established research 
questions and reach our conclusion. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
This report is organized in four chapters. Chapter I introduces the topic. In 
Chapter II, we perform a literature review of existing pertinent studies of the research 
topic. Chapter III contains the bulk of our study, in which we thoroughly analyze the 
dilemma facing contingency contracting officers tasked to prevent contracting with the 
enemy. Finally, Chapter IV presents the conclusions of our study and a specific policy 
recommendation designed to alleviate the threat of enemy business entities. 
E. SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the traditional contract processes authorized for use by 
contracting officers to exclude specific sources from competition, the vendor vetting 
program established to identify enemy business entities, and established case law that is 
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pertinent to contracting with the enemy. Additionally, we compare the standards of 
evidence and burden of proof required to prevent an enemy business from competing for 
contract award with the standards of evidence and burden of proof necessary to target 
hostile enemy combative. 
6 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The preponderance of existing literature regarding the modern challenge of 
contracting with the enemy has been published by agencies, groups, and individuals who 
are performing in a government oversight capacity. Of note, the Special Inspector 
General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) has made a point to repeatedly report on the challenges 
of the problem in its quarterly reports to Congress. In addition to the SIGAR, other 
agencies, like the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and the U.S. 
Congress, have commissioned reports on the contracting with the enemy topic and 
suggested recommendations to mitigate its challenges. In this literature review, we 
examine the existing body of knowledge regarding the topic of contracting with the 
enemy. 
A. WARLORD, INC. 
In June 2010, a report of the majority staff of the Subcommittee on National 
Security and Foreign Affairs was presented to the U.S. House of Representatives. The 
report, titled Warlord, Inc., provided evidence that the DOD’s $2.16 billion contract for 
logistical support had the potential to serve as a major funding source for the Taliban 
(Tierney, 2010). The contract, known as the HNT contract, “provides trucking for over 
70 percent of the total goods and materiel distributed to U.S. troops in the field” (Tierney, 
2010, p. 1). A key element of the contract specified that the contractors hired to do the 
trucking would be solely responsible for the security of their convoys. An unintended 
consequence of that contract stipulation created a de facto protection racket in which the 
transportation contractors would hire local warlords to provide security along the route. 
In addition to creating a harmful atmosphere of corruption and encouraging the behavior 
of unscrupulous warlords, Tierney’s report concluded that “protection payments for safe 
passage are a significant potential source of funding for the Taliban” (Tierney, 2010, p. 
34). The report went on to note that the Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF-A) 
conducted an investigation into the allegations that the HNT contract funded insurgent 
organizations and that Task Force (TF) 2010, a joint military organization tasked with 
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investigating corruption stemming from U.S. contracts, was established in response to the 
HNT contracts problems. 
While Warlord, Inc. is significant in the fact that it demonstrated the gravity of 
the contracting-with-the-enemy problem, its recommendations to Congress focused 
mostly on increasing contract oversight of logistics contractors in Afghanistan. All of the 
report’s recommendations are tailored specifically to the challenge of contracting for 
logistics support in Afghanistan. None of the report’s recommendations suggest that the 
U.S. government take action to preclude contractors affiliated with enemy organizations 
from competing on future contracts in other theaters of operations. 
B. SIGIR REPORT ON CERP PROGRAM IN IRAQ 
In April 2012, SIGIR published the results of an investigation they conducted into 
the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq. Instead of studying the 
effects of traditional contracting mechanisms, the report focused on the use of CERP 
funds by former unit commanders in Iraq. Between 2004 and 2010, over $4 billion in 
CERP funds were authorized by congress for use in Iraq. According to SIGIR (2012, p. 
1), “The CERP’s purpose was to enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian 
relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out 
programs and projects that provided immediate support to Iraqi people.” The 
investigation surveyed a sample of Army and Marine battalion commanders, U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (USACE) officials, Department of State (DOS) personnel, and 
officials of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The survey’s 
objectives were not specifically designed to identify or report on specific instances in 
which CERP funds were funneled to enemy organization, yet some of the survey 
respondents stated that they were aware that CERP funds may have fallen into insurgent 
hands. Most described a scenario similar to that of the HNT protection schemes in which 
some of the money spent on CERP projects was in turn distributed to insurgent 
organizations for protection (SIGIR, 2012). The SIGIR report does not provide specific 
recommendations aimed at mitigating the threat of CERP funds falling into enemy hands, 
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but it does stand as evidence that the problem is not unique to Afghanistan nor is it 
unique to large logistics and trucking contracts.   
C. SIGAR LETTER TO CONGRESS, SEPTEMBER 18, 2012 
In a September 2012 letter to members of the U.S. House of Representatives, the 
Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction John F. Sopko detailed the 
challenges of implementing the provisions of Section 841 of the FY 2012 NDAA. 
Sopko’s letter followed previous testimony to Congress and specifically lamented the 
delay in suspending and debarring contractors identified as affiliated with enemy groups. 
According to Sopko, the SIGAR had referred 242 cases to the Department of the Army, 
State Department, or USAID for suspension and debarment. Of those 242 cases, 106 
were still pending adjudication, including 43 cases that involved “insurgent” businesses 
(Sopko, 2012). Sopko argued that the government should suspend and debar those 
outstanding cases immediately and stated that SIGAR formally requested to be granted 
suspension and debarment authority from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
That authority, however, had not and has since not been delegated to SIGAR for use in 
Afghanistan. 
D. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY RESPONSE TO SENATOR JEANNE 
SHAHEEN 
In January 2013, the secretary of the Army, John M. McHugh, wrote a response to 
an inquiry from Senator Jeanne Shaheen. The response resulted from a letter sent to the 
secretary from Senator Shaheen concerning the suspension and debarment 
recommendations made by SIGAR. In the response to Senator Shaheen, Secretary 
McHugh describes the Army’s position on suspending and debarring contractors 
designated on the enemy entity list in accordance with Section 841 of the FY 2012 
NDAA. The 43 cases pending adjudication mentioned in the SIGAR’s letter are 
specifically mentioned by Secretary McHugh, who states that the SIGAR cases were 
referred for suspension and debarment without “any supporting evidence other than the 
fact that the subject individuals or entities were so designated” (McHugh, 2013, p. 1). 
Secretary McHugh went on to say that FAR § 9.406 requires a preponderance of 
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evidence showing that the contractor has engaged in serious misconduct in order to 
suspend and debar. Finally, Secretary McHugh concluded that “debarment based solely 
upon entry on the Entity List or Section 841 designation would fail to meet due process 
requirements and would likely be deemed arbitrary and capricious if challenged in court 
under the Administrative Procedure Act review” (McHugh, 2013, pp. 1–2). This position 
is at odds with the stance taken by SIGAR in its letter to Congress and demonstrates the 
difficulties associated with suspending and debarring enemy-affiliated business entities. 
E. SIGAR REPORT ON CONTRACTING WITH THE ENEMY 
In April 2013, SIGAR published a report titled that highlighted the challenges 
faced by DOD in preventing contracting with the enemy. The report was one of the first 
publications to address the challenges of precluding enemy-affiliated businesses from 
competition. In the report, SIGAR studied the effectiveness of the control measures put in 
place by the DOD to implement the requirements stipulated in Section 841 of the FY 
2012 NDAA. SIGAR ultimately concluded that the DOD’s processes to identify enemy-
affiliated contractors were not completely sufficient, especially when dealing with 
prospective subcontractors in Afghanistan. Additionally, the report stated that the DOD 
had not provided sufficient guidance to Heads of Contract Authority (HCA) on how to 
manage legal challenges to the enforcement of Section 841. Finally, the report concluded 
that the language of Section 841 was not sufficient in strength, stating that it did not 
cover DOS and USAID contracts in the CENTCOM Theater of operations. Furthermore, 
the SIGAR also called into question whether or not Section 841 designations were legally 
enforceable and bemused the fact that the legislation was scheduled to expire in 2014, 
prior to when U.S. forces were scheduled to leave the country. 
The SIGAR provided seven recommendations for action to help mitigate the 
contracting-with-the-enemy problem. They are as follows: 
• Require all Heads of Agency in the CENTCOM theater of operations,
including Afghanistan, develop a standard mechanism for distributing
Section 841 notification letters to their HCAs.
• Require all HCAs with contracts in the CENTCOM theater of operations,
including Afghanistan, to develop a standard mechanism for distributing
Section 841 notification letters to all prime contractors.
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• Direct HCAs to require prime contractors to certify that they do not have
subcontracts with Section 841 designees.
• Require all DOD contracting agencies and prime contractors with
contracts in the CENTCOM theater of operations to use an information
system, such as the Joint Contingency Contracting System or the
CENTCOM website, to track the Section 841 designations.
• Enforce DFARS Class Deviation 2012-O0005 that requires the Section
841 clause be included in contracts, unless HCAs provide justification for
exemption.
• Formally assign either the Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition
Policy or CENTCOM the responsibility for centrally tracking, at a
minimum, the number and value of contracts, grants, and cooperative
agreements HCAs have restricted, terminated, or voided using their
Section 841 authorities.
• Develop and distribute guidance to HCAs about actions to take once they
have restricted, terminated, or voided a contract under Section 841.
(SIGAR, 2013, pp. 8–9)
The SIGAR’s recommendations focused heavily on standardizing the processes 
used to identify enemy business entities and disseminate that information to HCAs. 
Furthermore, the SIGAR was concerned with the potential for prospective subcontractors 
to funnel money to enemy entities. Finally, recommendation seven specifically highlights 
the problem of legal challenges to the enforcement of Section 841. This is the first time 
that the problem of using the contract processes authorized by the FAR to solve a military 
problem, like that of enemy-affiliated contractors, was acknowledged by a government 
agency. 
F. SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 
OCTOBER 30, 2014 
In late 2013, John Sopko reiterated his frustrations with current policies regarding 
contracting with the enemy. 
This quarter, I must once again reiterate my concerns about the policies of 
the U.S. Army’s suspension and debarment program. As I have pointed 
out in our last six quarterly reports, the Army’s refusal to suspend or debar 
supporters of the insurgency from receiving government contracts because 
the information supporting these recommendations is classified is not only 
legally wrong, but contrary to sound policy and national-security goals. I 
remain troubled by the fact that our government can and does use 
classified information to arrest, detain, and even kill individuals linked to 
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the insurgency in Afghanistan, but apparently refuses to use the same 
classified information to deny those same individuals their right to obtain 
contracts with the U.S. government. There is no logic to this continuing 
disparity. I continue to urge the Secretary of Defense and Congress to 
change this misguided policy and to impose common sense on the Army’s 
suspension and debarment program. (Sopko, 2014, p. iii) 
This excerpt was included in Special Inspector General John Sopko’s introduction 
to the agencies quarterly report to Congress dated October 30, 2014. The tone of Sopko’s 
report indicates a high degree of frustration with the U.S. Army’s decision not to suspend 
and debar contractors identified by the provisions of Section 841. Sopko also identified a 
significant injustice created by U.S. government policy in Afghanistan where the military 
used classified information to “arrest, detain, and even kill individuals linked to the 
insurgency,” yet would not use the same classified information to suspend and debar 
contractors (Sopko, 2014, p. iii). 
G. SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 
JANUARY 30, 2015 
In the January 30, 2015 report, Sopko provided a more optimistic opinion on the 
government’s efforts to prevent contracting with the enemy. After reiterating his concerns 
about the Army’s policy on suspension and debarment, Sopko (2015, p. iii) said about the 
prospect of reform: 
I am encouraged by the fact that the new U.S. military leadership in 
Afghanistan shares our concerns about this issue. Following a briefing by 
SIGAR in Afghanistan this quarter, we learned that the Army’s newly 
appointed Suspension and Debarment Official has begun a review of the 
issue. I am hopeful that common sense will ultimately be applied to the 
Army’s suspension and debarment program to prevent supporters of the 
insurgency from obtaining government contracts. 
Despite the SIGAR’s cautious optimism, there is no significant indication that the 




The dangers of contracting with the enemy have been discussed widely amongst 
members of the U.S. legislature, the DOD, and government oversight agencies like 
SIGAR and SIGIR. Those entities unanimously agree that contracting with the enemy is a 
real danger that poses serious and grave threats to U.S. security interests, and generally 
agree that more needs to be done to mitigate the effects of enemy-affiliated contractors. 
Consensus agreement does not exist regarding which method or methods should be 
employed to restrict contracting with the enemy, though. SIGAR has repeatedly lobbied 
for expedited suspension and debarment of businesses identified as Section 841 entities. 
On the other hand, the secretary of the Army has decided that businesses that are 
designated Section 841 entities don’t warrant suspension and debarment unless a 
preponderance of evidence exists that indicates that the businesses engaged in serious 
misconduct. Figure 1 is a chronological depiction of the literature we reviewed during 
this study. In the next chapter, we examine the burden that policy creates for contingency 
contracting officers. 
 
Figure 1.  Literature Review Chronology 
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III. THE CONTRACTING OFFICER’S DILEMMA
In this chapter, we exam the cumulative factors that affect the contracting 
officer’s ability to mitigate contracting with the enemy. First, we discuss the inherent 
differences between command authority, contract authority, and suspension and 
debarment authority. Then, we define the standard contracting processes available to the 
contracting officer. Next, we compare the legal standards associated with standard 
contract processes with those used by the government for military status determinations. 
Following that, we provide research from our case law study that examines how the 
judicial system has interpreted laws and regulations pertinent to the contracting-with-the-
enemy problem. Finally, we conclude the chapter by explaining how the cumulative 
effects of laws, regulations, and polices create the contracting officer’s dilemma. 
A. COMMAND AUTHORITY, CONTRACT AUTHORITY, AND 
SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT AUTHORITY 
In this section, we define command authority, contract authority and suspension 
and debarment authority. All three of these authorities derive their power from unique 
legal sources and operate with different mandates. In order to understand the greater 
contracting-with-the-enemy problem, it is important to acknowledge the differences 
between these authorities. 
1. Command and Contract Authority
Understanding the roles of contracting versus command authority and command 
relationships is a fundamental that must be understood because both military and legal 
consequences are possible if those lines are blurred when applying contracting processes. 
The difference between these two types of authority requires close coordination but yet 
must maintain a distinct separation. The Contract and Fiscal Law Department (2012), 
explained contract authority originates from the U.S. Constitution and explicitly states: 
As a sovereign entity, the United States has inherent authority to contract 
to discharge governmental duties. This authority to contract is limited. 
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Specifically, a government contract must: 1. not be prohibited by law, and 
2. be an appropriate exercise of governmental powers and duties. (p. 3)
Joint Publication (JP) 4-10, Operational Contract Support (DOD, 2014) 
summarizes contract versus command authority as: 
Contracting authority is not the same as command authority. Contracting 
authority is the legal authority to enter into binding contracts and obligate 
funds on behalf of the U.S. Government (USG), while command authority 
includes the responsibility for effectively using available resources and 
planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and 
controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. 
Command authority does not include the authority to obligate funds or 
enter into contracts on behalf of the USG. These two different authorities 
should be closely coordinated to provide effective and efficient contracted 
support to the joint force.  
Contracting authority is a unique aspect of contracting support in that only 
the contracting officer (KO) has the authority to obligate the USG. This 
authority to acquire supplies, services, and construction for the 
government comes from four sources: the U.S. Constitution; statutory 
authority; legislative appropriations; and Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) (including DOD and Military Department supplements). 
Contracting authority in the operational area flows from the U.S. 
Constitution to the Service/agency head, to the Service senior procurement 
executives (SPEs) to designated Head of Contract Activity (HCA), then 
either directly to the contracting officer or to the contracting officer 
through the Senior Contracting Official (SCO). This contracting authority 
is explicitly documented via the contracting officer’s warrant. A warrant is 
the document that authorizes a contracting officer to award a contract to 
obligate the government to expend funds for contracted support 
requirements.  
Combatant command (command authority), prescribed in Title 10, U.S.C., 
Section 164, includes the authority to perform functions involving 
organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks and 
designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects 
of an operation; it does not include authority to make binding contracts or 
modify existing contracts for the USG. It is also important to note that 
Geographical Combatant Commands (GCCs) do not have their own 
contracting authority. The GCCs direct and coordinate contingency 
contracting support through their subordinate Service components and 
combat support agencies (CSA). Additionally, command authority does 
not include the authority to direct contractor or contractor personnel 
actions outside the terms and conditions of their contract. (p. I–10) 
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Army Field Manual (FM) 4-92, Contracting Support Brigade (CSB), illustrates 
contracting authority within the Army under the new Army modular contracting structure 
(Department of the Army, 2010). The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition 
Logistics and Technology (ASA [ALT]) has appointed the Expeditionary Contracting 
Command (ECC) commander as the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) for Army 
theater support contracting. With the consolidation of the Army’s contingency 
contracting officers, operational commanders receive theater, contracting, planning and 
execution support by the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) aligned CSBs. 
CSB commanders receive their delegations of contracting authority from the ECC. 
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) codifies this authority under Title 48, 
Chapter 1, of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. FAR § 1.601 precisely states that the 
authority and responsibility to contract for authorized supplies and services are vested in 
the agency head unless specifically prohibited by another provision of law (2015). The 
agency head may establish contracting activities and delegate broad authority to manage 
the agency’s contracting functions to heads of such contracting activities. Contracts may 
be entered into and signed on behalf of the government only by contracting officers. In 
some agencies, a relatively small number of high-level officials are designated 
contracting officers solely by virtue of their positions. Contracting officers below the 
level of a head of a contracting activity shall be selected and appointed under FAR § 
1.603 (2015).  
The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) (2015) 
defines the “Head of Agency” as the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the 
Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force. Subject to the discretion of the 
Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics), and the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, the directors 
of the defense agencies have been delegated authority to act as head of the agency for 
their respective agencies and identifies the Department of the Army’s Senior 
Procurement Executive (SPE) as the ASA (ALT), which is also known as the Army 
Acquisition Executive (AAE) (DFARS, 2015, § 202.101). The Army Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (AFARS) § 5101.692 authorizes the HCA to assign a principal assistant 
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responsible for contracting (PARC) who is the senior staff official for a contracting 
activity responsible for all contracting functions (2015). The Army Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement (AFARS) § 5101.692 authorizes the HCA to assign a Principal 
Assistant for Responsible for Contracting (PARC) who is the senior staff official for 
a contracting activity responsible for all contracting functions. The PARC could also 
be known as the SCO or Chief of Contracting Office (COCO) depending on the 
level of contracting support required and task organization. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate 
the lines of authority and legal contracting authority respectively. 
Figure 2.  Lines of Authority (from DCCHB, 2012, p. 29) 
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Figure 3.  Legal Contract Authority (from DCCHB, 2012) 
For example, in a large-scale contingency operation, JP 4-10, Operational 
Contract Support (DOD, 2014) demonstrates that, under Title 10 authority, the GCC may 
establish a subordinate joint command to accomplish mission tasks: 
Since acquisition authority is not inherent to combatant command 
(command authority), the supported GCC coordinates the issuance of an 
HCA authority designation letter from the Service SPE of the Service 
component directed to form the building block for the Joint Theatre 
Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) SCO contracting authority to 
support the contingency as directed. [In which if the Army was designated 
as the Lead Service Component (LSC) for contracting, the Army’s 
Contracting Support Brigade would be the building block for the JTSCC.] 
The GCC would normally pre-coordinate the HCA authority requirement 
with the appropriate Service SPE with the authority to become effective 
upon the standup of the JTSCC as directed in a execute order or 
fragmentary order (FRAGO). 
The primary task of the JTSCC is to effectively and efficiently 
synchronize all theater support contracting under a single command and 
control (C2) structure and provide responsive contracting support to the 
Joint Force Command. The JTSCC would have a key secondary task to 
execute coordination authority over designated contracting activities 
supporting the Joint Task Force (JTF). (p. E-7) 
Under a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command organization, the 
commanding officer serves as the HCA and delegate’s contract warrant authority to 
subordinate SCOs and attached contingency contracting officers (CCOs) whom operate a 
Regional Contracting Center (RCC) and/or a Regional Contracting Office (RCO). 
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Operationally, SIGAR Audit 12-7 (2012) described the CENTCOM-JTSCC (C-
JTSCC) formation and command relationship: 
In April 2010, CENTCOM issued a fragmentary order to transition all 
current responsibilities with the Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and 
Afghanistan to C-JTSCC. Among other things, this order required C-
JTSCC to execute centralized contracting oversight for all DOD contracts 
in Afghanistan, including contracts managed by other DOD contracting 
organizations as part of the Theater Business Clearance process. C-JTSCC 
is also required to directly manage certain contracts on behalf of U.S. 
Forces-Afghanistan and its subcommands, such as the Combined Security 
Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). Further, C-JTSCC is 
required to establish and chair a Joint Contracting Support Board to ensure 
synchronization and unity of effort for contracting, including establishing 
contract visibility procedures and reports and coordinating the 
enforcement of contract management policies for external support and 
systems support. As executive agent for contracting for Afghanistan and to 
support C-JTSCC’s expanded mission, the Assistant Secretary of the 
Army appointed the C-JTSCC Commander as the Head of the Contracting 
Activity for Afghanistan, which established C-JTSCC’s overall 
responsibility for managing the contracting activity. In addition to its other 
responsibilities, C-JTSCC collects contracting data from other DOD 
contracting organizations operating in Afghanistan, including the USACE 
and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment.  
The C-JTSCC Commander designated the Senior Contracting Official-
Afghanistan (SCO-A) to serve as the principal contracting authority of C-
JTSCC’s contracts. The SCO-A has direct responsibility over theater 
support contracting and manages contracts for DOD organizations in 
Afghanistan. The SCO-A has about 150 contracting officers in 
Afghanistan, who are responsible for entering into, administering, and 
terminating contracts. Many of these officers are deployed to 1 of 14 
RCCs performing contracting services in various locations throughout 
Afghanistan. (pp. 2–3) 
Contracting Officers are appointed by a warrant, using the Standard Form SF 
1402 Certificate of Appointment, which provides the legal authorization to enter into 
binding contracts and obligate appropriated funds on behalf of the U.S. government. 
Contracting officers are appointed from a source of actual contract authority, by the Head 
of Agency or designee and not command authority. Military authority is exercised 
through the chain of command, and the contingency contracting officer (CCO) is subject 
to the rules of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Contract authority is exercised 
21 
through the SPE, HCA, and SCO, and is subject to civilian statues and regulations 
governing the acquisition of goods and services for the U.S. government. 
Conflict could arise from when a military order by the GCC directs the contractor 
to perform outside the scope of his or her contract, which becomes an unauthorized 
obligation, or when a military order is given and the CCO must abide by that order, but 
deprives the contractor of his or her rights as given by the FAR. The contractor has the 
right to protest and challenge the CCO’s actions according to standard business processes 
when contracting with the U.S. government. This protest may be subject to review by the 
Court of Federal Claims (COFC). If the COFC rules in favor of the contractor, the CCO 
must abide by that ruling, thus putting the CCO in contention with the GCC’s military 
order, resulting in the possibility of the CCO being subject to UCMJ action, Article 92—
Failure to obey an order or regulation. Challenges that resulted from specific contracting 
processes are examined by case review to determine their effects against the contracting 
officer. Our goal is to identify specific tools for the CCO to focus on in order to mitigate 
challenges and negative outcomes, and ultimately prevent future contracts with the 
enemy. 
2. Suspension and Debarment Authority
The authority to suspend and debar contractors exists outside of both the contract 
and command channels of authority. FAR Subpart 9.4 provides wide latitude to federal 
agencies on suspension and debarment programs. Specifically, FAR § 9.402 states that 
“agencies are encouraged to establish methods and procedures for coordinating their 
debarment or suspension actions” (2015). Furthermore, the FAR defines suspension and 
debarment officials as agency heads or designees authorized by the agency head. There is 
some variety in how different federal agencies establish and execute their suspension and 
debarment programs. The Army, the agency responsible for suspension and debarments 
in Afghanistan, has designated the chief of the Procurement Fraud Branch of the Contract 
and Fiscal Law Division of the U.S. Army Legal Services Agency as their Suspension 
and Debarment Official (AFARS, 2015, § 5109.402). In the next section, we will further 
examine the criteria with which the SDO uses to make decisions. 
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B. STANDARD CONTRACTING PROCESSES 
The primary means available to contracting officers in the fight against enemy-
affiliated contractors are the responsibility determination and suspension, debarment, and 
ineligibility referrals. However, as discussed in the literature review, the reluctance of the 
Department of Defense to suspend and debar enemy-affiliated business entities has 
increased the importance of the responsibility determination to preclude Section 841 
entities from competition. Unfortunately, the exclusive use of unfavorable responsibility 
determinations to prohibit businesses from competition may result in de facto debarment. 
Under circumstances where de facto debarment exists, the government is vulnerable to 
litigation from the aggrieved party. This section examines how contracting officers use 
the standard contracting processes authorized by the FAR to prohibit sources from 
competition. We pay special attention to which party the burden of proof rests with and 
what standards of evidence are required for each decision. Finally, we discuss the 
ramifications that arise when de facto debarment of a prospective contractor exists. 
1. Responsibility Determination
The current policy of not pursuing suspension and debarment of Section 841 
identified that contractors have increased the importance of the contracting officer’s 
responsibility determination. FAR § 9.1, Contractor Qualifications, defines the criteria for 
what constitutes responsible contractors. It also provides guidance to contracting officers 
on how to execute the responsibility determination. FAR § 9.103 (2015) states that 
“purchases shall be made from, and contracts shall be awarded to, responsible 
prospective contractors only.” FAR § 9.104-2 establishes general standards for what 
constitutes a responsible contractor (2015). While most of them are concerned with the 
ability of the potential source to fulfill the contract, some of the standards can be applied 
to contracting-with-the-enemy scenarios. Specifically, FAR § 9.104-1(c) requires 
contractors to “have a satisfactory performance record” and FAR § 9.104-1(d) requires 
contractors to “have a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics” (2015). Thus, 
businesses that have a history of affiliation with enemy agents may not meet the general 
standards for responsibility under those two clauses. 
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FAR Part 9 goes on to discuss the relationship between prime contractors and 
their affiliates or sub-contractors. FAR § 9.104-3(c) states: 
Affiliated concerns are normally considered separate entities in 
determining whether the concern that is to perform the contract meets the 
applicable standards for responsibility. However, the contracting officer 
shall consider the affiliates past performance and integrity when they may 
adversely affect the prospective contractor’s responsibility. (2015) 
In regards to subcontractors, FAR § 9.104-4(a) “generally, prospective prime 
contractors are responsible for determining the responsibility of their prospective 
subcontractors. Determinations of prospective subcontractor responsibility may affect the 
Government’s determination of the prospective prime contractor’s responsibility” (2015). 
FAR § 9.104-4(b) goes on to state: 
When it is in the government’s interest to do so, the contracting officer 
may directly determine a prospective subcontractor’s responsibility (e.g., 
when the prospective contract involves medical supplies, urgent 
requirements, or substantial subcontracting). In this case, the same 
standards used to determine a prime contractor’s responsibility shall be 
used by the Government to determine subcontractor responsibility. (2015) 
The FAR’s guidance on affiliated concerns and subcontractor responsibility is 
critically important for contracting officers operating in immature contingency 
environments where the business relationships between prime contractors and their 
affiliated concerns and sub-contractors may not be completely transparent. In those cases, 
the FAR gives contracting officers the ability to apply the same standards for prime 
contractors to their subcontractors and affiliates. Therefore, if a prime contractor cannot 
satisfactorily establish the responsibility of his or her subcontractors, the contracting 
officer can make a nonresponsibility determination for the prime. 
Contracting officers affect a positive responsibility determination when they 
apply their signature to the contract award. When the contracting officer determines that a 
prospective contractor is in fact not responsible, the contracting officer is required to 
document the reasons why and file that information in the contract file (FAR , 2015, § 
9.105-2). Note that the FAR does not specifically require the contracting officer to notify 
the prospective contractor of the nonresponsibility determination. Additionally, 
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prospective contractors are generally not granted due process to defend their interests 
when unfavorable responsibility determinations are made (Manuel, 2013). The extension 
of due process rights to prospective contractors during responsibility determinations has 
some very notable exceptions though. According to a 2013 report by the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), “when nonresponsibility determinations are based upon 
concerns about contractors’ integrity, contractors are potentially entitled to due process 
because courts recognize contractors’ liberty interest in being able to challenge 
allegations about their integrity that could deprive them of their livelihood” (Manuel, 
2013, p. 12). This is especially relevant to the contracting-with-the-enemy problem, as 
the satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics standard was previously identified 
as a standard that contracting officers could use to prevent Section 841 contractors from 
receiving an award. The CRS report goes on to state that, “contractors could potentially 
also be entitled to due process if repeated nonresponsibility determinations were made on 
the same basis—even when that basis is not integrity-related—if the determinations 
constitute de facto debarment” (Manuel, 2013). Therefore, repeat determinations of 
nonresponsibility for a prospective contractor, regardless of the reason for 
nonresponsibility, may result in the contractor litigating the U.S. government for 
deprivation of due process rights. 
The use of the responsibility determination has several strengths that make it a 
powerful tool in the fight against enemy-affiliated contractors. First, the authority to 
make responsibility determinations rests with the contracting officers. This allows for 
decisions to be made in a relatively responsive manner in accordance with the specific 
circumstances of each contract solicitation. Next, nonresponsibility determinations 
typically do not warrant due process rights on behalf of the prospective contractor 
excluded from competition. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the criteria for 
making responsibility determinations is broad enough to allow for significant discretion 
on behalf of the contracting officer. The contracting officer need only document the 
reason for the nonresponsibility determination in the contract file. For those reasons, the 
use of the responsibility determination is generally effective at precluding enemy-
affiliated contractors from receiving contract awards on specific solicitations. 
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There are, however, some drawbacks to the exclusive use of the responsibility 
determination in the fight against enemy-affiliated contractors. Responsibility 
determinations are designed to preclude contractors from competition on just one specific 
contract award. They are not designed to repeatedly block prospective contractors from 
multiple contract awards. When used repeatedly, the government becomes vulnerable to 
litigation due to de facto debarment. Additionally, since the responsibility determination 
is only applicable to one specific contract award, it does not result in any long term 
punitive effects against the prospective contractor. Furthermore, the contracting officer 
incurs added work each time a Section 841-identified contractor competes for award, as 
the contracting officer must document and justify the reasons for the nonresponsibility 
determination. This may seem like a trivial burden, but in a contingency environment, 
contracting officer workloads can be significant, and added requirements to document 
repeated nonresponsibility determinations can adversely affect the Procurement 
Administrative Lead Time (PALT). 
2. Suspension, Debarment, and Ineligibility
Suspension and debarment procedures are employed by federal agencies to 
prevent nonresponsible businesses from competing for contract award. The use of 
suspension and debarment procedures dates back to the Reagan administration and 
Executive Order 12549. In that order, Reagan directed that all “executive departments 
and agencies shall participate in a system for debarment and suspension” and that 
“debarment or suspension of a participant in a program by one agency shall have 
government-wide effect” (Executive Order No. 12549, 1986). Reagan’s actions created a 
system in which federal agencies could effectively punish non-responsible contractors by 
prohibiting them from future competition. 
FAR § 9.4 provides guidance on the use of suspension, debarment, and 
ineligibility procedures. First, it is important to note the distinction in meaning between 
the three words. Suspension according to FAR § 2.101 “means action taken by a 
suspending official under 9.407 to disqualify a contractor temporarily from government 
contracting and government-approved subcontracting” (2015). In contrast, the FAR states 
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that debarment “means action taken by a debarring official under FAR § 9.406 to exclude 
a contractor from government contracting and government-approved subcontracting for a 
reasonable, specific period” (2015). The difference in the two terms is the time specified 
that the contractor is either suspended or debarred. Suspension is typically a temporary 
measure taken by a suspending official prior to a final debarment decision that will last 
for a defined period of time. Ineligibility refers to contractors that are otherwise ineligible 
for government contracts. FAR § 2.1 states that “ineligible means excluded from 
government contracting (and subcontracting, if appropriate) pursuant to statutory, 
executive order, or regulatory authority other than this regulation (48 CFR chapter 1) and 
its implementing and supplementing regulations” (2015). This means that contractors 
found in violation of an existing law are in effect ineligible to receive a contract award. 
Suspension and debarment decisions are typically made by a suspension and 
debarring official. The SDO can either be the procuring agency head or “a designee 
authorized by the agency head to impose suspension” (FAR, 2015, § 9.403). In the 
Army’s case, the agency responsible for contracts in suspension and debarment decisions 
in Afghanistan, the SDO is a designated official appointed by The Judge Advocate 
General of the Army (AFARS, 2015, § 5109.403). The SDO official weighs the merits of 
a suspension and debarment recommendation prior to making a decision to suspend or 
debar a contract. Table 1 illustrates the various causes and evidentiary standards required 
to make either a suspension or debarment decision. It is important to note that there are 
distinctly different evidentiary requirements for suspension and debarment. Typically, 
suspension requires only adequate evidence of wrongdoing for the SDO to make an 
affirmative suspension decision. Debarment, on the other hand, is stricter and typically 
requires a conviction or preponderance of evidence of wrongdoing for an affirmative 
debarment decision. The evidentiary standards required for suspension and debarment 





Table 1.   Causes for Suspension and Debarment (from FAR, 2015, § 9.4) 
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3. Conclusion
The standard contract processes available to the contracting officer to prevent 
enemy-affiliated contractors from doing business with the U.S. government are the 
responsibility determination, suspension, debarment, and ineligibility. The responsibility 
determination is designed only to be implemented as a one-off decision for a specific 
contractor on a specific solicitation. When used repeatedly, responsibility determinations 
result in de facto debarment which contributes to an environment ripe for litigation 
against the U.S. government. Suspension, on the other hand, is a decision to prohibit a 
specific contractor from competing on contracts from any federal agency for a temporary 
period of time. Debarment is an even more serious determination and prohibits a 
contractor from competition for a fixed period of time. Since suspension and debarment 
are generally considered to be strict punishments for contractor malpractice there are 
greater evidentiary standards associated with the decision making process. While a 
responsibility determination can be made at the contracting officer level based on the 
contracting officer’s discretion, suspension and debarment decisions are reserved for the 
agencies’ SDO official. Suspension decisions typically require adequate evidence of 
wrongdoing, and debarment decisions usually require either a criminal conviction or a 
preponderance of evidence in order for the decisions to be made against a contractor. 
In addition to the greater evidentiary burdens, suspension and debarment 
proceedings allow for due process on behalf of the contractor prior to the decision, 
whereas responsibility determinations only afford due process to the contractor after the 
decision is made. Table 2 depicts the differences between nonresponsibility 
determinations and debarment. The limitations imposed by the need to provide due 
process to contractors and meet strict evidentiary standards contribute to make 
suspension and debarment a difficult tool to apply to the contracting-with-the-enemy 
problem. The responsibility determination allows for greater flexibility on behalf of the 
contracting officer, yet if used repeatedly, can result in de facto debarment. Finally, 
ineligibility refers to contractors that are simply ineligible to compete for contract award 
due to a law, statute, executive order, or regulation.  
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Table 2.   Comparison of Nonresponsibility Determinations and Debarment 
(after Manuel, 2013) 
C. MILITARY DETERMINATIONS OF ENEMY STATUS 
In this section, we analyze how the U.S. government identifies and determines the 
statuses of enemy combatants and businesses. The purpose of this section is to compare 
the legal standards used to identify enemy personnel with the standards used by the DOD 
to identify enemy businesses in Afghanistan. For the purposes of this paper, we refer to 
the standards used to target personnel as military targeting and the standards used to 
identify enemy-affiliated contractors as vendor vetting.   
1. Military Targeting
Military targeting policy is a wide area of study with roots in the Law of War, 
Geneva Convention, and Hague Treaty. The U.S. Army’s Operational Law Handbook 
describes the legal basis for the use of military force. Within that handbook, the Army 
JAG provides a justification for the preemptive use of military force. 
Nonresponsibility Debarment
Decision Maker Contracting Officer Suspension and Debarment Official
Criteria Adequate financial resources
Ability to comply with delivery and performance 
schedule
Satisfactory performance record
Satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics
Necessary organization and experience
Necessary equipment and facilities
Otherwise qualified and eligible
Fraud or Criminal Offenses in obtaining or 
performing a public contract or subcontract
Violations of federal or state antitrust laws
Embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, etc.
Intentionally misusing "Made in America" 
designation
Other offenses indicating a lack of business 
integrity or honesty that seriously affect the present 
responsibility of a contractor
Duration Single contract award Fixed time proportionate to the offense (generally 
not more than three years)
Application Applies to companies that have not previously had 
government contracts, as well as current and prior 
government contractors
Generally applied to current government 
contractors, although potentially applicable to 
prospective or prior contractors




Responsibility determinations may generally be 
challenged with GAO only when any special 
standards are not met or other “serious concerns” 
are raised
Exclusion determinations are generally not 
protestable with GAO
Comparison of Nonresponsibility Determinations and Debarment
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In the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), the U.S. Government took a 
step toward what some view as a significant expansion of use of force 
doctrine from anticipatory self-defense to preemption. This position was 
reinforced in the 2006 NSS, which reaffirmed the doctrine of preemptive 
self-defense against “rogue states and terrorists” who pose a threat to the 
United States based on their expressed desire to acquire and use weapons 
of mass destruction. The “Bush Doctrine” of preemption re-casted the 
right of anticipatory self-defense based on a different understanding of 
imminence. Thus, the NSS stated, “We must adapt the concept of 
imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.” 
It concluded: “The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—
and the more compelling the case for taking action to defend ourselves, 
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s 
attack.” The 2010 NSS, however, suggests a possible movement away 
from the Bush Doctrine, as the Obama Administration declares in the NSS 
that, “ while the use of force is sometimes necessary, [the United States] 
will exhaust other options before war whenever [it] can, and [will] 
carefully weigh the costs and risks of action versus the costs and risks of 
inaction.” Moreover, according to the 2010 NSS, “when force is necessary 
… [the United States] will seek broad international support, working with 
such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.” Nevertheless, 
the Obama Administration maintains that “the United States must reserve 
the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our nation and our 
interests, yet we will also seek to adhere to standards that govern the use 
of force.” (International and Operational Law Department, 2014, pp. 6–7) 
The analysis of the U.S. government’s policies towards preemptive military 
targeting is useful to our study because it bears some similarities to the challenge of 
preventing contracting with the enemy. In the case of preemptive use of force, the 
government justifies preemptive military action when national security is threatened. In 
contrast, contracting officers must also use preemptive actions to prevent enemy-
affiliated contractors from doing business with the government. In order to compare the 
legal standards affecting the contracting officer’s preemptive actions, we will analyze the 
U.S. government’s current policy on preemptive lethal targeting of U.S. citizen’s 
affiliated with enemy terrorist organizations overseas. Therefore, we limit our scope 
within this section to current doctrine used by the Obama administration to target U.S. 
civilians actively engaged in terrorist activities that threaten national security. In 2013, 
President Obama explained U.S. policy on the subject to an audience at the National 
Defense University. 
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When a U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America—and is 
actively plotting to kill U.S. citizens; and when neither the United States, 
nor our partners are in a position to capture him before he carries out a 
plot—his citizenship should no more serve as a shield than a sniper 
shooting down on an innocent crowd should be protected from a SWAT 
team. (Obama, 2013) 
A declassified Department of Justice (DOJ) white paper from 2011 described the 
legal interpretations used by the Obama administration to target U.S. civilians actively 
working within al-Qa’ida abroad. The paper concluded that the lethal targeting of U.S. 
citizens is justified if the following three conditions are met (DOJ, 2011, p. 1): 
• An informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined
that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack
against the United States.
• Capture is infeasible, and the United States continues to monitor whether
capture becomes feasible.
• The operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable
law of war principles.
In reaching that conclusion, the DOJ weighed the constitutional rights of the 
individual to be targeted against the threat posed to national security as a result of that 
person’s actions. The white paper argued that the person’s interest in his or her own life 
“must be balanced against the United States’ interest in forestalling the threat of violence 
and death to other Americans” (DOJ, 2011, p. 2). Therefore, a U.S. citizen identified as a 
senior member of al-Qa’ida or an affiliate organization is not entitled to due process 
rights. 
The white paper also addressed the evidentiary standards required to determine if 
the U.S. citizen in question poses an “imminent” threat to national security. DOJ argues 
that clear evidence linking the U.S citizen to an imminent violent attack against the 
United States is not necessary nor feasible to acquire in most cases. “Delaying action 
against individuals continually planning to kill Americans until some theoretical end 
stage of the planning for a particular plot would create an unacceptably high risk that the 
action would fail and that American casualties would result” (DOJ, 2011, p. 7). 
Furthermore, DOJ asserted “that an individual poses an ‘imminent threat’ of violent 
attack against the United States where he is an operational leader of al-Qaida or an 
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associated force and is personally and continually involved in planning terrorist attacks 
against the United States” (DOJ, 2011, p.8). Therefore, U.S. government policy justifies 
the lethal targeting of U.S. citizens who are senior operational leaders of enemy terrorist 
organizations on that basis alone. 
Lethal targeting of U.S. citizens abroad is a difficult decision to make and is 
subject to grave consequences. For that reason, it is a very controversial topic in the court 
of opinion. For the purposes of this study, we are only interested in the legal principles in 
effect for analogous use to the contracting-with-the-enemy problem. Those legal 
principles were tested in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia when the 
family of Anwar Al-Aulaqi filed suit against members of the Obama Administration. The 
plaintiffs asserted that Al-Aulaqi’s constitutional rights were violated when he was killed 
by a U.S. military drone strike in Yemen. The court dismissed the law suit in favor of the 
defendants, finding that the father of Al-Aulaqi “did not have standing to assert his son’s 
constitutional rights … and that at least some of the issues raised [in the lawsuit] were 
non-justiciable political questions” (Al-Aulaq et al. v. Panetta et al., 2014, p.4). That 
ruling by the district court, effectively upheld the principles outlined in the DOJ white 
paper justifying the lethal targeting of U.S. citizens involved as senior operational leaders 
of all-Qa’ida and its affiliates.  
2. Vendor Vetting
The Department of Defense established the vendor vetting program in response to 
Section 841 of the FY 2012 NDAA. Section 841 directed the DOD to establish a program 
within CENTCOM that would 
use available intelligence to review persons and entities who receive 
United States funds through contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements 
performed in the USCENTCOM theater of operations and identify any 
such persons and entities who are actively supporting an insurgency or 
otherwise actively opposing United States or coalition forces in a 
contingency operation” (Public Law 112-81, 2011, § 841). 
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Vendor vetting is the means by which CENTCOM implements that directive. 
Two years, Section 831 of the FY 2014 NDAA expanded the language of the previous 
law to include all overseas major commands. That guidance was codified and 
disseminated in a class deviation to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) by the Director for Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, 
Richard Ginman. That class deviation directs all overseas Combatant Commanders 
(COCOM) to establish a program for identifying contractors actively opposing the United 
States and then notify their respective HCA. The HCA, without power of delegation is 
then authorized to take the following actions: 
• Prohibit, limit, or otherwise place restrictions on the award of any DOD
contracts to such identified persons or entities.
• Terminate for default any DOD contracts when the HCA determined that
the contractor failed to exercise due diligence to ensure that none of the
funds received under the contract are provided directly or indirectly to
such identified person or entity.
• Void, in whole or in part, any DOD contract that provided funds to such
identified person or entity. (Ginman, 2014).
In Afghanistan, USCENTCOM has established a two-phase approach to execute 
the guidance found in Section 841 of the FY 2012 NDAA and its successors. The first 
phase consists of the identification of contractors affiliated with enemy insurgent forces. 
First, TF 2010, an entity within U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), conducts an 
intelligence assessment of current and potential contractors within Afghanistan. Based on 
the results of that assessment, TF 2010 develops individual targeting packages for each 
contractor suspected of supporting adversarial forces (SIGAR, 2013). Those targeting 
packages are then routed through the International Security and Assistance Force Joint 
Command in Afghanistan for concurrence. After that, they are forwarded to the 
USCENTCOM commanding general for final approval. If the USCENTCOM 
commander determines that the individual contractor is in fact supporting the enemy, 
then he or she forwards that status determination to the HCA for further action in phase 
two of the vendor vetting process. 
34 
In phase two, the HCA is responsible for identifying any contracts between its 
organization and Section 841–designated entities. If the HCA identifies that a current 
contract with a Section 841 entity exists, they are authorized, but not required, to restrict 
award, terminate for default, or void in part or whole the contract. The SIGAR conducted 
a survey of the various HCAs and heads of agency responsible for executing phase two in 
order to determine its effectiveness. Seven of the 11 respondents surveyed by the SIGAR 
indicated that they had no formal process for complying with the Section 841 provisions. 
One HCA in particular suggested that their agency only conducts “an informal poll of its 
contracting officers” to determine if a Section 841 individual was involved in one of their 
contracts (SIGAR, 2013, p. 14). Fortunately, the SIGAR went on to indicate that many of 
the agencies involved were in the process of drafting formalized procedures for managing 
Section 841 identifications. Figure 4 illustrates the flow of information during phase one 
and two of the vendor vetting process. 
Figure 4.  Vendor Vetting Process (from SIGAR, 2013, p. 12) 
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The provisions pertaining to contracting with the enemy in the FY 2012 NDAA 
and FY 2014 NDAA do not establish evidentiary standards for the identification of 
enemy-affiliated business. Determining what exactly constitutes behavior that affiliates a 
contractor with the enemy is left up to TF 2010 and the respective combatant 
commander. The NDAAs also do not dictate whether or not those contractors identified 
as being affiliated with the enemy should be granted due process rights. The notion that 
contractors identified as being affiliated with the enemy should be granted due process 
rights has been argued in the U.S. Court of Federal claims, though (MG Altus Apache 
Company v. United States, 2013). That case and others like it are analyzed in the case law 
analysis section of this chapter. 
3. Conclusion
In this section, we analyzed the standards the U.S. government uses for lethal 
targeting and the processes by which the DOD identifies enemy-affiliated business 
entities in Afghanistan. From this analysis, we concluded that the legal standards used to 
apply nonresponsibility determinations are to make a debarment decision are in some 
ways stricter than the standards used to lethally target a U.S. citizen operating with al-
Qa’ida overseas. This dichotomy is most noticeable in the evidentiary standards and due 
process requirements needed to make the decisions. For instance, debarment generally 
requires a conviction for a crime or a preponderance of evidence in favor of misconduct 
for the debarring official to make a decision. In contrast, the DOJ has argued that the 
government only needs to prove that a U.S. citizen poses an imminent threat to the 
United States in order to identify him or her for lethal targeting. Additionally, the DOJ 
argues against allowing due process for citizens identified for lethal targeting, whereas 
companies identified for debarment are allowed due process. Table 3 depicts the 
differences in criteria, due process standards, and evidentiary standards for 
nonresponsibility determinations, debarment, and lethal targeting of U.S. citizens. These 
legal standards make the fight against contracting with the enemy more complex than it 
has to be, as the contracting officer must use the standard contract processes available to 
him or her to make a decision based on military necessity. 
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Table 3.   Comparison of Nonresponsibility Determination, Debarment, and Lethal Targeting of U.S. Citizens (after DOJ, 
2013; Manuel, 2013; FAR, 2015, § 9.4) 
 
 
Nonresponsibility Debarment Lethal Targeting of US Citizen
Decision Maker Contracting Officer Suspension and Debarment Official High Level US Government Official
Criteria Adequate financial resources
Ability to comply with delivery and performance 
schedule
Satisfactory performance record
Satisfactory record of integrity and business 
ethics
Necessary organization and experience
Necessary equipment and facilities
Otherwise qualified and eligible
Fraud or Criminal Offenses in obtaining or 
performing a public contract or subcontract
Violations of federal or state antitrust laws
Embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, etc.
Intentionally misusing "Made in America" 
designation
Other offenses indicating a lack of business 
integrity or honesty that seriously affect the 
present responsibility of a contractor
Senior operational leader of Al-Qa'ida or an 
affilliate organization who poses an imminent 
threat of violent attack against the United States, 
where capture is infeasible
Due Process Generally after decision Prior to decision, but with mitigation No
Evidentiary Standards Contracting Officer Discretion, subject to review 
by GAO or Federal Courts
Conviction or preponderance of evidence 
suggesting wrongdoing
Must prove citizen in question poses an imminent 
threat United States
Comparison of Nonresponsibility Determination, Debarment, and Lethal Targeting of US Citizens
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D. CASE LAW 
Current laws allow for the termination of a current contract once a status 
determination is obtained. However, there is no law preventing the enemy-affiliated 
contractor (KTR) from competing for future contracts unless a formal hearing for 
suspension and debarment is conducted and sustained. It has been directed by the 
Secretary of the Army that each status-determined business entity as an enemy is entitled 
to due process from suspension and debarment. When cases are forwarded to the agency 
suspension and debarment officer for review, the majority of them are thrown out due to 
lack of evidence. This allows for the KTR to compete for future contracts. The possibility 
exists that a KTR may sue the KO for de facto debarment when a contracting officer 
(KO) uses their discretion to determine a responsibility status based on past performance 
and excludes the KTR from competition because of a prior status determination of being 
affiliated with the enemy.  
The purpose of these legal case reviews is to examine contracting issues arising 
from surrounding circumstances and the court’s rulings as solutions to those problems, 
and possible ramifications for the KO. Information gathered from the review can be used 
as a foundation to justify a KO’s future decision as rational and reasonable or reveal 
challenges the KO may face when implementing contract management tools. Topics of 
interest include established precedence, the court’s decision to acknowledge a liberty 
interest and due process rights for businesses that have been determined affiliated with 
the enemy, the KO’s discretionary decision-making authority, military status-
determinations, responsibility determinations, past performance evaluations, and rights to 
classified information. Significant questions are: 
• What decision is being made?
• Who is responsible for making the decision?
• What standard of evidence is necessary to make the decision?
• Upon whom does the burden of proof reside?
• What risk is inherent in the decision(s)?
The review format consists of identifying the topic the case presents, placing it 
into context by describing the nature of legal proceedings, and describing the issue (the 
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legal standard or rule), the application of the rule, the conclusion or ruling by the judicial 
official, and a summary.  
• Topic: Relevant contractual topics key pertaining to the legal case
• Context: Nature of legal proceedings
• Issue: The issue is the challenge or legal issue presented by the fact pattern
of the surrounding circumstances
• Rule: The rule consists of several elements which, when met, dictate a
legal outcome or constitute a legal standard
• Application: Applying the elements of rule to the facts in order to prove or
disprove the legal question at issue
• Conclusion: Resolution of the legal issue or challenge
1. Al-Aulaqi et al. v. Panetta et al., 2014
a. Topic
Status determination; Fifth Amendment rights; Due process 
An overview of Al-Aulaqi et al. v. Panetta et al. (2014) is summarized in Table 4 
for quick reference. 
Table 4.   Overview of Al-Aulaqi et al. v. Panetta et al. (2014) 
Plaintiff Defendant
Issue Denied Fifth Amendment rights; Targeted 
killings took place outside the context of 
armed conflict that relied on vague legal 
standards, a closed executive process, and 
evidence never presented to the courts 
therefore denying Fifth Amendment Rights.
Court lacks jurisdiction due to the 





Nonjusticiable policical question doctrine; Fifth Amendment—Due Process Clause
The court finds the actions of U.S. officials targeting U.S. citizens aboard without due 
process as justiciable, thus establishing their jurisdiction for review. U.S. citizens are 
entitled to constitutional protections even when abroad. Ex parte Quirin  states citizens 
who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its 
aid, guidance, and direction enter the United States with the intent of hostile acts are 
enemy belligerents with the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.
The court does not conceive that the plaintiff was entitled to notice and a hearing or that 
official actions were deliberately conducted indifferent to the plaintiffs Fifth Amendment 
rights. Defendant’s motion to dismiss was granted.
Al-Aulaqi et al. vs Panetta et al. (2014)
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b. Context
Anwar Al-Aulaqi was a leader within al-Qa’ida Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and 
the United States determined him to be an enemy and a threat to national security. The 
United States launched a drone strike in Yemen on September 30, 2011, which killed Al-
Aulaqi and a passenger with him named Samir Khan. Both were U.S. citizens. The 
United States launched another drone strike in Yemen two weeks later that killed 
Abdulraham Al-Aulaqi, Anwar’s son, although he was not a target. Nasser Al-Aulaqi, the 
father of Anwar and grandfather of Abdulraham, and Sarah Khan, the mother of Samir, 
claim U.S. officials who authorized the drone strikes deprived the deceased of their Fifth 
Amendment rights. Nassir and Sarah represent the deceased and bring suit against the 
United States (specifically former Secretary of Defense Panetta, former Joint Special 
Operations Commander Admiral McRaven). This case was heard at the U.S. District 
court for the District of Columbia in 2014. 
c. Issue
The plaintiffs claim that the deceased were denied Fifth Amendment rights, 
specifically substantive and procedural due process rights, Fourth Amendment rights to 
be free from unreasonable seizures, the deprivation under the Constitution’s Bill of 
Attainder clause and U.S. officials should be held accountable and personally liable for 
their actions and roles in authorizing drone strikes against targeted personnel that are U.S. 
citizens. The plaintiffs allege “that the targeted killings took place in Yemen, which was 
outside the context of armed conflict and that these killings relied on vague legal 
standards, a closed executive process, and evidence never presented to the courts” (Al-
Aulaqi v. Panetta, 2014). The United States responds with a move to dismiss because the 
court lacks jurisdiction due to the complaint raising a nonjusticiable political question, 
special factors preclude implying a cause of action under a cited case, and that the 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity (Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 2014). Pointedly, we 




Fifth Amendment—Due Process Clause: The guarantee of due process for all 
citizens requires the government to respect all rights, guarantees, and protections afforded 
by the U.S. Constitution and all applicable statutes before the government can deprive a 
person of life, liberty, or property. Due process essentially guarantees that a party will 
receive a fundamentally fair, orderly, and just judicial proceeding. While the Fifth 
Amendment only applies to the federal government, the identical text in the Fourteenth 
Amendment explicitly applies this due process requirement to the states as well. 
Procedural due process ensures fundamental fairness by guaranteeing a party the right to 
be heard, ensures that the parties receive proper notification throughout the litigation, and 
ensures that the adjudicating court has the appropriate jurisdiction to render a judgment. 
Substantive due process requires all governmental intrusions into fundamental rights and 
liberties be fair and reasonable and in furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest as 
protecting those rights so fundamental as to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty 
(LII, 2015). 
Nonjusticiable Political Question/Political Question Doctrine is a ruling by the 
Supreme Court in which federal courts should not hear cases that are directly involved 
with issues that the U.S. Constitution makes the sole responsibility of the other 
government branches to make.  
e. Application
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution establishing judicial powers of U.S. 
Courts, establishes courts as having limited jurisdiction, and states that Article III does 
not encompass judicial supervision over the president’s designation as enemies against 
the United States. Consequently, the status determination challenge becomes a 
nonjusticiable political question. Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean 
Society (1986) rules that the political question doctrine excludes from judicial review 
those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations 
constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the 
Executive Branch. Baker v. Carr (1962) ruled that the conduct of foreign relations is the 
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sole responsibility of the executive branch and any issue or challenge in the way that the 
executive branch is using its constitutional power presents a political question. The U.S. 
Constitution authorizes the president to act as the Commander-in-Chief and direct the 
performance of military functions by the U.S. military in which within these functions are 
tasks that are important during the conduct of war. Although the court recognized: 
powers granted to the Executive and Congress to wage war and provide 
for national security does not give them carte blanche to deprive a U.S. 
citizen of his life without due process and without any judicial review. The 
interest in avoiding the erroneous deprivation of one’s life is uniquely 
compelling. The Bill of Rights was passed to protect individuals from an 
over-reaching government, and this Court cannot refuse to provide an 
independent legal analysis. (Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 2014)  
The court finds the actions of U.S. officials targeting U.S. citizens aboard without 
due process as justiciable, thus establishing their jurisdiction for review. Reid v. Covert 
(1957) holds that U.S. citizens are entitled to constitutional protections even when 
abroad. The court holds this ruling and states that because the deceased were killed in 
Yemen, their basic legal rights still stood under the U.S. Constitution.  
Due process protects an individual from arbitrary exercise of governmental 
power. A plaintiff must establish a protected interest in life, liberty, or property to argue a 
procedural due process claim and show that government officials knowingly deprived the 
individual of that interest without notice and nor an opportunity to be heard (Daniels v. 
Williams, 1986). A plaintiff must assert his or her constitutional rights were disregarded 
in such a way that the government official was deliberately indifferent and that the 
official’s conduct shocks the conscience, “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly 
be said to shock the contemporary conscience” (Estate of Phillips v. Dist. of Columbia, 
2006). Although, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld ruled that the use of military force against those 
individuals, even U.S. citizens, who fight against the U.S. military is permissible under 
the Constitution. Ex parte Quirin states: 
citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy 
government, and with its aid, guidance, and direction enter the United 
States with the intent of hostile acts are enemy belligerents with the 
meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.  
42 
Davidson v. Cannon (1986) ruled that a due process claim is not valid if prompted 
by the lack of due care by an official causing inadvertent injury or damage to life, liberty, 
or property and the County of Sacramento et al. v. Lewis et al. (1998) stated the 
Constitution does not guarantee due care on the part of state officials; liability for 
negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due 
process, therefore, the court ruled that Samir Khan and Abdulrahman Al-Aulaqi’s due 
process claim are dismissed. 
The plaintiffs continued to argue Anwar Al-Aulaqi’s deprivation of due process 
and Anwar’s execution was without charge, indictment, nor prosecution. The plaintiffs 
also claim that the drone strike that killed Anwar was with deliberate indifference to his 
constitutional rights to life. The court does not conceive that Anwar was entitled to notice 
and a hearing or that the drone strike shocked the conscience: 
The fact is that Anwar Al-Aulaqi was an active and exceedingly 
dangerous enemy of the United States, irrespective of his distance, 
location, and citizenship. As evidenced by his participation in the 
Christmas Day attack, Anwar Al-Aulaqi was able to persuade, direct, and 
wage war against the United States from his location in Yemen, i.e., 
without being present on an official battlefield or in a “hot” war zone. 
Defendants, top military and intelligence officials, acted against Anwar 
Al-Aulaqi, a notorious AQAP leader, as authorized by the AUMF. Special 
factors––including separation of powers, national security, and the risk of 
interfering with military decisions––preclude the extension of a Bivens 
remedy to such cases. (Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta et al., 2014) 
f. Conclusion
The U.S. District Court Judge grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss for the 
reasons previously mentioned. 
g. Summary
(1) What decision is being made? 
• Are U.S. citizens entitled to constitutional protection rights abroad, even if
they have been determined an enemy?
• Was there a deprivation of due process, which is a constitutional
protection?
(2) Who is responsible for making the decision? 
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The Executive branch has the constitutional authority to make such decisions 
when weighed against national security interests. It is the court’s reasoning to review 
such challenges if a claim becomes a nonjusticiable political question whereas the court 
lacks jurisdiction to review executive and military decisions, or if such decisions are 
judicially discoverable.  
(3) What standard of evidence is necessary to make the decision? 
The manner in which what standards of evidence are used when making an enemy 
determination is not judicially discoverable as not to interfere with foreign policy or 
military actions. Such determinations by the Executive branch and top military officials 
are trusted to be in good faith as to protect the United States and national interests.  
(4) Upon whom does the burden of proof reside? 
In this case, with a post-deprivation claim of due process, the claimant has the 
burden of proof to demonstrate the unfair and arbitrary acts of governments that result in 
a shock to the conscience. The government only has a burden of persuasion to the court 
that the claim is a nonjusticiable political question whereas the court has no jurisdiction, 
and no Bivens claim of special factors is applicable because the claimant was determined 
to be an enemy.  
(5) What risk is inherent in the decision(s)? 
The Court recognizes the possibility of a plausible claim and the opportunity to be 
heard. The Court establishes a forum, post-facto, to present a case. Enemy of the state or 
not, the court recognizes the challenge and will hear the argument and ultimately decide 
the legitimacy of the claim and rule. 
2. James Filor et al. v. The United States, 1867
a. Topic
Contract authority; Contracts with the enemy; Status determination 
An overview of James Filor et al. v. The United States (1867) is summarized in 
Table 5 below for quick reference. 
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Table 5.   Overview of James Filor et al. v. The United States (1867) 
 
b. Context 
The case was presented in the Court of Federal Claims in 1867. This case sets the 
precedent that all contracts with the enemy are void. The plaintiffs, Filor and Curry, seek 
a monetary remedy from a lease for “Tift’s Wharf and Warehouse” which was agreed 
upon with Lieutenant J. S. Gibbs, acting quartermaster, for $6,000 payable quarterly. The 
plaintiffs, before the lease, obtained the land from Asa. F. Tift, through his attorney, 
Charles Tift, December 27, 1861. Asa F. Tift appointed his brother with power to sell his 
property on May 21, 1861, before entering behind confederate lines and supporting the 
Confederacy during the Civil War. Asa Tift, who was identified as an active enemy, was 
trying to protect his property through the aid of Charles Tift, as a loyal citizen of the 
Union, from confiscation or military seizure.  
Plaintiff Defendant
Issue Entitled to rent by the U.S. government 
which was agreed upon and signed by way 
of a lease. Key West, FL, was not in a state 
of rebellion or insurrection, was a loyal part 
of the United States and Constitutional laws 
were to be upheld.  
Challenged the validity and legality of the 
transfer of deed. The recipient were was not 
authorized under his power of attorney to 
act on behalf of a status determined enemy 
on the sale of property or exercise monetary 




Presidential proclamation, August 16, 1861 - Commercial business between the citizens 
of states in insurrection and citizens of the United States is unlawful.
The deed transferred to the plaintiffs by Asa Tift through means of power of attorney by 
Charles Tift is void under the rule of law which prohibits contracts between enemies. 
Charles Tift was executing the sale of the property to the plaintiffs on behalf of Asa Tift 
who was determined to be a confederate. It is as if Asa Tift, a known enemy, had 
executed the sale himself to the plaintiffs, thus making the contract void and effectively 
making the plaintiffs have no authority to execute a contract with the U.S. government. 
No license or exception was ever granted by the government to enter into a contract on 
these terms. Therefore, the commanding officer of and quartermaster had no authority to 
   The deed to the petitioners was void, as a contract between enemies, and that the U.S. 
military was not a legal authorized party to enter into a contract in terms of lease for 
property to which the title was invalid by circumstances known to the officers at the time 
the lease was made. Subsequently, the United States are not parties to the lease, nor 
liable.
James Filor et al. v. The United States (1867)
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No money or rent was ever given to the plaintiffs under a lease. The plaintiffs 
continually submitted the lease to the quartermaster general, but was never approved nor 
disapproved. After several attempts and a refusal to pay by the quartermaster general, the 
plaintiffs filed a claim.  
c. Issue
• Was the transfer of deed between Charles Tift and the plaintiffs void or
voidable by law?
• Was the quartermaster authorized to bind the U.S. government as a party
in this contract?
The plaintiffs claim they are entitled to rent by the U.S. government which was 
agreed upon and signed by way of a lease. Filor and Curry have a complete, good, and 
perfect deed for the property. Key West, Florida, was not in a state of rebellion or 
insurrection. It was a loyal part of the United States and Constitutional laws were upheld. 
Payment to Charles Tift for the sale of the property to the plaintiffs was deposited in a 
Havana bank account. No money was ever received by Asa Tift during the war. It was the 
intent of Charles Tift and the plaintiffs to avoid giving aid to the enemy. The judge 
advocate general and quartermaster general challenged the validity and legality of the 
transfer of deed by Charles Tift. Charles Tift was not authorized under his power of 
attorney to act on behalf of Asa Tift on the sale of property or exercise monetary 
discretion because Asa Tift was determined to be an enemy when he left for occupation 
within rebel lines and supported the Confederacy. 
d. Rule
On August 16, 1861, the President proclaimed: 
The inhabitants of the States of Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia, North 
Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, 
and Florida, in a state of insurrection against the United States; and that all 
commercial intercourse between the same and the inhabitants thereof, with 
the exceptions aforesaid, and the citizens of other States and other parts of 
the United States, is unlawful, and will remain unlawful until such 
insurrection shall cease or has been suppressed. (James Filor et al. v. The 
United States, 1867) 
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Commercial intercourse, or commercial business, is unlawful between any 
persons determined to be the enemy and the U.S. government. Commercial intercourse 
extends to contracts. Therefore, it is law that contracting with the enemy is illegal. 
e. Application
• Asa Tift was a citizen of Key West who owned the property known as
“Tift’s wharf.”
• Asa Tift was a member of the Florida convention that passed the
ordinance of secession from the Union on January 9, 1861.
• May 21, 1861: Charles Tift was granted power of attorney by Asa Tift to
authorize him to sell any part of his property.
• December 28, 1861: Charles Tift recorded the sale of the property and
transfer of deed to the plaintiffs.
• January 24, 1862: The plaintiffs leased the wharf to the United States.
• The commanding officer at Key West and the quartermaster entered into
the lease with full knowledge that the plaintiffs received their deed from
Asa Tift who joined the confederacy, and in effect, was at war with the
United States, deeming him an enemy.
In accordance with the August 16, 1861, proclamation, the deed transferred to the 
plaintiffs by Asa Tift through means of power of attorney by Charles Tift is void under 
the rule of law which prohibits contracts between enemies. Within the context of a 
principal–agent relationship, Asa Tift, determined to be a confederate, was qui facit per 
alium, facit per se when Charles Tift was executing the sale of the property to the 
plaintiffs December 28, 1861. It is as if Asa Tift, a known enemy, had executed the sale 
himself to the plaintiffs, thus making the contract void and effectively making the 
plaintiffs have no authority to execute a contract with the U.S. government over Tift’s 
wharf. 
This calls into question the authority to bind the United States as a party to this 
lease. If the United States is obligated, then the United States is subject to the rules and 
laws pertaining to leases. “A cardinal rule is that the lessee cannot, and the court cannot, 
put in issue the title of the lessor, for his claim does not depend on his title, but on the 
contract of lease” (James Filor et al. v. The United States, 1867). Then the claim 
becomes a remedy to Asa Tift for the occupation of the property upon agreed lease terms, 
and not the legality of the deed possessor. 
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There is no rule of law preventing a sovereign state from contracting with the 
enemy if a license is granted by reasonable exception. When the commanding officer and 
quartermaster entered into a lease, aware of Asa Tift operating with free will as an enemy 
against the United States, no license or exception was ever granted by the government to 
enter into a contract on these terms. Therefore, the commanding officer of Key West and 
quartermaster had no authority to bind the United States. 
f. Conclusion
It is the opinion of the court by Loring, 
And we decide as points of law—1. That the deed from A. F. Tift to the 
petitioners was void, as a contract between enemies, and 2. That the 
officers of the quartermasters’ department at Key West were not 
authorized to hire for the United States premises, the title to which was 
invalid by circumstances known to the officers at the time the lease was 
made, and that the United States are not parties to the lease, nor liable 
thereupon. (Filor et al. v. U.S., 1867) 
g. Summary
(1) What decision is being made? 
• Is a contract void or voidable?
• What legal authorization is present to bind a party into a contract?
• Is the agent authorized to bind the principal into a contract?
(2) Who is responsible for making the decision? 
In this case, the contract between the sale of the property between Asa Tift and 
the plaintiffs is void because it is unlawful to enter into contracts with the enemy, and 
therefore any contract entered into by the U.S. government and the plaintiffs is void. The 
quartermaster was not authorized to contractually bind the United States, nor is it lawful 
to bind the U.S. government into a contract with the enemy unless a license or protection 
is granted.  
(3) What standard of evidence is necessary to make a decision? 
It is clear and convincing evidence that the law of agency, which establishes the 
legal authority for the agency to act on behalf of the principal, is apparent. It is implicit 
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that an agent authorized to act on behalf of its principal has authorization to bind the 
principal into a contract with the government. It is this principal–agent relationship that is 
based on the Latin maxim Qui facit per alium, facit per se, which means “he who acts 
through another is deemed in law to do it himself.” It was also, through preponderance of 
evidence, that Asa F. Tift sustained allegiance to the state of Florida in its secession from 
the Union, left, joined the confederacy, and in effect, was at war with the United States, 
deeming Asa Tift an enemy. 
(4) Upon whom does the burden of proof reside? 
The claimant, or plaintiff, had to establish facts showing that the lease was signed 
in accordance with law. Filor and Curry could not dispute the fact that Asa F. Tift was 
determined to be a confederate, therefore outlawing any commercial business actions 
associated with Tift or the transfer of deed became void in accordance with the 
presidential proclamations. 
(5) What risk is inherent in the decision(s)? 
If the KO determines the contract to be void or voidable and terminates the 
contract, the KTR can protest the legality of the binding contract and appeal the KO’s 
decision to seek remediation. If the Court finds the claim to be sustained and the contract 
to be upheld, a breach of contract could be awarded to the contractor. 
3. MG Altus Apache Company v. The United States, 2013
a. Topic
KO responsibility determination; KO discretion; KTR past performance; Status 
determination; Vendor vetting; De facto debarment; Due process; Liberty interest 
An overview of MG Altus Apache Company v. The United States (2013) is 
summarized in Table 6 below for quick reference. 
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Table 6.   Overview of MG Altus Apache Company v. United States (2013) 
b. Context
Mesopotamia Group Altus Apache (MG AA) Company protested the KO’s 
nonresponsibility determination and exclusion from competition in an award for a 
National Afghan Trucking (NAT) contract for transportation services in Afghanistan. 
MG AA alleged the Army relied upon a classified vendor vetting rating scheme as the 
basis for a nonresponsibility determination. This illegally applied a de facto debarment 
standard against them, excluding them from competition. MG AA alleged the vendor 
vetting’s program procedures were imprudent and therefore were blacklisted from 
receiving the award. MG AA requested injunctive relief from the vendor vetting 
assessment and responsibility determination. 
c. Issue
MG AA challenged the determination of the KO’s nonresponsibility decision as 
arbitrary and claimed the vendor vetting assessment was unreasonable because a rejected 
rating disqualifies any KTR from entering into a contract with the U.S. government. The 
Plaintiff Defendant
Issue Challenged the determination of the KO’s 
nonresponsibility decision as arbitrary and claimed the 
vendor vetting assessment was unreasonable because 
a rejected rating disqualifies any KTR from entering 
into a contract with the U.S. government. The resulting 
de facto debarment stripped the plaintiff of any due 
process.
The KO listed sareas of concern when notifying MG 
AA that regarded an ongoing responsibility evaluation 
with an opportunity to provide corrective action. The 
response was not sufficient to correct or prevent 
future occurrences of deficient performance. The KO 
was not obligated to notify MG AA of a rejected 
status resulting from a vendor vetting assessment, 





Fifth Amendment—Due Process Clause; FAR Contractor Qualifications; CENTCOM FRAGO 10-330, and 
International Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC) FRAGO 606-210
The U.S. government infringed on Fifth Amendment protection against unfair treatment in legal processes; this 
in turn evoked procedural due process rights protection from arbitrary denial of life, liberty, or property. 
COFC recognized this infringement by the U.S. government and the right to be heard, however, due process 
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Basic elements of due 
process such as notice, grounds, opportunity to respond and be heard, are subject to essential national 
security considerations.
The plaintiff’s request for permanent injunction was denied. The KO’s nonresponsibility determination as a 
whole was rational. The evidence on which the KO relied on was sufficient to support a conclusion that their 
judgment was reasonable.
MG Altus Apache Company v. United States ( 2013)
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resulting de facto debarment stripped MG AA of any due process. When de facto 
debarment is a result of U.S. government infringement, the deprivation of a KTR’s 
constitutionally protected liberty interest evokes procedural due process rights under the 
Fifth Amendment. 
MG Altus Apache Co. is a joint venture consisting of Mesopotamia Group 
Services Limited (MG), Altus Supply and Services (Altus), and Apache Defense, LLC 
(Apache). MG is an American-owned company operating exclusively within 
Afghanistan. MG is identified as the Lead Member responsible for program, contract, 
accounting, and financial management on behalf of the joint venture. In response to the 
NAT contract solicitation (February 22, 2011), MG AA submitted a proposal. The 
solicitation stated offerors are evaluated for responsibility in accordance with FAR § 9.1 
(Contractor Qualifications—Responsible Prospective Contractors). MG was in a joint 
venture with Ettefaq-Meliat-Hai-Afghan Consulting, Inc. (EMA) under the Host Nation 
Trucking (HNT) contract for transportation services within Afghanistan. MG AA listed 
the HNT contract as a reference for evaluation. 
 On July 25, 2011, the Combined Joint Staff for Counter-Intelligence and Human 
Intelligence Operations (CJ2X) determined MG AA vendor’s rating. CJ2X, a military 
intelligence unit, is charged with assessing and evaluating vendors in accordance with the 
vendor vetting program. On July 29, 2011, the Army eliminated all offerors whose 
proposals failed either the technical or price requirements and forwarded the acceptable 
proposals for responsibility determinations. On July 30, 2011, the KO informed MG AA 
of its responsibility evaluation and identified several areas of concern in relation to MG 
EMA’s past performance of the HNT contract. The areas of concern listed MG EMA’s 
noncompliance with In-transit Visibility (TTV) contract requirements, failure to meet 
Private Security Contractor (PSC) Arming Requirements, forged Transportation 
Movement Requests (TMRs), and withholding of contract payments for failed missions, 
canceled no-pay missions, pilferage, and back charges. The notice also cited letters of 
concern and cure notices issued to MG EMA on five separate dates. On August 1, 2011, 
MG AA responded to the KO’s responsibility evaluation notice, outlining “relevant 
circumstances, mitigating factors, and corrective actions specific to each area of concern” 
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(MG Altus Apache Company v. United States, 2013). On August 10, 2011, MG AA was 
informed that it had been eliminated from competition because the MG AA had been 
determined nonresponsible.  
d. Rule
FAR § 9.103 (Contractor Qualifications–Policy) 
(a) Purchases shall be made from, and contracts shall be awarded to, 
responsible prospective contractors only. 
(b) No purchase or award shall be made unless the contracting officer 
makes an affirmative determination of responsibility. In the absence of 
information clearly indicating that the prospective contractor is 
responsible, the contracting officer shall make a determination of 
nonresponsibility.  
FAR § 9.104-1 (Contractor Qualifications – General Standards) 
To be determined responsible, a prospective contractor must 
(a) Have adequate financial resources to perform the contract, or the 
ability to obtain them; 
(b) Be able to comply with the required or proposed delivery or 
performance schedule, taking into consideration all existing commercial 
and governmental business commitments; 
(c) Have a satisfactory performance record. A prospective contractor shall 
not be determined responsible or nonresponsible solely on the basis of a 
lack of relevant performance history; 
(d) Have a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics; 
(e) Have the necessary organization, experience, accounting and 
operational controls, and technical skills, or the ability to obtain them 
(including, as appropriate, such elements as production control 
procedures, property control systems, quality assurance measures, and 
safety programs applicable to materials to be produced or services to be 
performed by the prospective contractor and subcontractors).  
(f) Have the necessary production, construction, and technical equipment 
and facilities, or the ability to obtain them; and 
(g) Be otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award under 
applicable laws and regulations. 
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FAR § 9.104-3(b) (Contractor Qualifications – Application of Standards) 
Satisfactory performance record—A prospective contractor that is or 
recently has been seriously deficient in contract performance shall be 
presumed to be nonresponsible, unless the contracting officer determines 
that the circumstances were properly beyond the contractor’s control, or 
that the contractor has taken appropriate corrective action. Past failure to 
apply sufficient tenacity and perseverance to perform acceptably is strong 
evidence of nonresponsibility. Failure to meet the quality requirements of 
the contract is a significant factor to consider in determining satisfactory 
performance. The contracting officer shall consider the number of 
contracts involved and the extent of deficient performance in each contract 
when making this determination. 
e. Application
It is important to understand the application of FAR § 9.104-1 and the 
justification of the KO’s decision to determine MG AA as nonresponsible first before 
applying the vendor vetting procedures and rules. By finding the KO’s responsibility 
determination to be reasonable, it [the KO’s discretion to determine responsibility] 
eliminates MG AA as an apparent successful offeror. By eliminating MG AA as an 
apparent successful offeror, the KO was not required to inform MG AA of its vendor 
vetting rating that excluded it from competition in accordance with CENTCOM 
Contracting Command Acquisition Instruction, CENTCOM FRAGO 10-330, and 
International Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC) FRAGO 606-210 that 
outlines vendor vetting program and procedures. 
A KO shall determine a prospective contractor non responsible if there is an 
“absence of information clearly indicating that the prospective contractor is responsible” 
(FAR § 9-103(b)). The KO listed seven areas of concern when notifying MG AA that 
regarded an ongoing responsibility evaluation with an opportunity to provide corrective 
action. MG AA responded with the required “relevant circumstances, mitigating factors, 
and corrective actions specific to each area of concern” (MG Altus Apache Company v. 
United States, 2013), but the KO determined the response was not sufficient to correct or 
prevent future occurrences of deficient performance. It is in this response the KTR, MG 
AA, bears the burden of proof to demonstrate to the KO they are capable and responsible 
in accordance with FAR § 9-104.1 Contractor Qualifications–General Standards. The KO 
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found “absence of information” to satisfy these requirements and therefore determined 
MG AA nonresponsible.  
MG AA claims the KO improperly considered past performance when evaluating 
MG AA’s responsibility for the NAT procurement. MG AA asserts that any negative 
performance issues under the HNT contract were the fault of EMA. MG and EMA 
operated as a joint venture under the HNT contract. MG AA submitted its experience 
under the HNT as evidence under the MG EMA joint venture for transportation services 
in Afghanistan, but pushes total blame on EMA. MG AA disclaimed responsibility for 
MG EMA’s HNT performance, stating that “all of the negative issues identified in third 
party reports were solely EMA issues according to the terms of the MG EMA Joint 
Venture agreement and the actual activities of the two parties during performance of the 
HNT contract” (MG Altus Apache Company v. United States, 2013).  
The court reviewed MG EMA’s HNT proposal to MG AA’s proposal and found 
under both joint venture agreements MG’s responsibilities were the same. MG AA’s vice 
president of corporate development, whom was proposing to be the program manager, 
was the same program manager under the MG EMA joint venture. MG AA’s reliance on 
MG EMA’s performance to justify their capability and using MG EMA as a reference in 
the NAT procurement, it is reasonable for the KO to consider MG EMA’s past 
performance evaluation when determining MG AA’s responsibility. The HNT and NAT 
contract considerably have the same mission requirements. MG operated under a joint 
venture during the HNT contract and proposed a joint venture for the NAT contract under 
which the would perform in the same functional role as a lead member and program 
manager. “As the Comptroller General has recognized, in evaluating past performance, 
the key consideration is whether the experience evaluated reasonably can be considered 
predictive of the offeror’s performance under the contemplated contract” (MG Altus 
Apache Company v. United States, 2013). 
FAR § 9.601(1) defines contractor team arrangement as an arrangement in which 
two or more companies form a partnership or joint venture to act as a potential prime 
contractor. The COFC defines as a general rule that “each member of a joint venture has 
the authority to act for and bind the enterprise, absent agreement to the contrary” (MG 
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Altus Apache Company v. United States, 2013). The court reasoned based on analogy that 
MG and EMA had the authority to act for and bind each other under the MG EMA joint 
venture agreement. “Thus, CJ2X’s attribution of EMA’s conduct to the MG EMA joint 
venture was, on this record, consistent with law. So too, the contracting officer’s reliance 
on CJ2X’s conclusion was reasonable” (MG Altus Apache Company v. United States, 
2013). “The Comptroller General has recognized, information in investigative reports 
may be used as the basis of a nonresponsibility determination” (MG Altus Apache 
Company v. United States, 2013). MG AA continued to contend that the KO’s reliability 
on CJ2X’s vender vetting assessment was irrational, arbitrary, and capricious because 
CJ2X’s conclusions were outdated, constituted de facto debarment, and deprived MG AA 
of due process.  
On November 5, 2010, CENTCOM Contracting Command issued an Acquisition 
Instruction directing all KOs to vet non-United States vendors operating in Afghanistan 
as ordered by CENTCOM FRAGO 10-330 and IJC FRAGO 606-210.  
Non-U.S. vendors must submit location and identification information 
within the Joint Contingency Contracting System (JCCS). The KO then 
submits a vetting request to JCCS. CJ2X assess the vendor by risk to 
mission and classified that risk as moderate, significant, high, or extremely 
high. A classification, or rating, of high or extremely high required a 
validation panel to approve or reject the vendor by considering the 
intelligence assessment and other relevant information. A rejected vendor 
is ineligible to receive contract awards in Afghanistan and the intelligence 
assessment is forwarded to the requesting activity. An Exception to Policy 
(ETP) waiver is an option the requesting activity can submit. This is called 
a Rejected Contractor Waiver and is submitted by the Battle Space Owner, 
not the KO. The waiver process must be complete within 30 days after 
notification by CJ2X and must be signed by the Deputy Commander for 
United States Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR–A). 
Notification to the vendor is only required if the vendor would otherwise 
be the apparent successful offeror and the vendor requested a debriefing. If 
a vendor is an apparent successful offeror the KO could only inform him 
or her in writing you were determined to be ineligible for award of subject 
contract by United States Forces—Afghanistan/Iraq. You may submit a 
written request for reconsideration of this determination to USFOR–
A/USF–I, through the Contracting Officer, within 60 calendar days of this 
notification, otherwise, the KO is not to mention their ineligibility. CJ2X 
attempts to re-vet every 180 days if possible. CJ2X’s vendor assessment 
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and classification, or rating, is upheld for a period of one year. (MG Altus 
Apache Company v. United States, 2013) 
On July 25, 2011, CJ2X classified MG AA as rejected. The KO inquired if the 
requiring activity would be seeking a waiver. The requiring activity declined on August 
3, 2011. Therefore, MG AA was ineligible for any U.S. government contracts in 
Afghanistan and was the basis, as required, for the KO’s determination of 
nonresponsibility on August 10, 2011. MG AA claimed the KO’s reliability on CJ2X’s 
intelligence report and assessment was irrational due to inaccuracy and outdated Intel. 
COFC cited precedence that allowed the KO to rely on assurances from another agencies 
and it is not arbitrary and capricious for the KO to trust military intelligence that was two 
years old. 
MG AA further claims that the vendor vetting process is illegal, as it deprived 
MG AA of due process. The status determination of rejected excluded MG AA from 
contract awards without notice or an opportunity to respond. Not only is MG AA 
prohibited from the NAT procurement award, but from all potential U.S. government 
contracts in Afghanistan by way of de facto debarment and therefore was blacklisted by 
how the KO acted in bad faith and unfair dealing. 
The court began to establish the reason it [COFC] to hear, discuss, and remedy a 
claim of de facto debarment. The court establishes jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  
to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting to a 
solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a proposed 
contract or to a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged 
violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a 
proposed procurement. (FAR § 1491(b)(1)) 
Where a claim of de facto debarment as a result of the vender vetting program 
deprived MG AA of due process violating their constitutional rights. Because MG AA’s 
vendor vetting rating was the basis for the KO’s responsibility evaluation under the NAT 
procurement, the court entertains the “constitutional challenge to that vetting process 
predicated on a denial of due process is fair game” (MG Altus Apache Company v. United 
States, 2013).  
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The court acknowledged the CJ2X’s rating of rejected operated as de facto 
debarment, wherein, the U.S. government prohibits procurement awards to the KTR and 
in effect threatens the KTR’s livelihood and breaching the KTR’s Constitutional right to 
liberty. MG AA claims the de facto debarment violates the procedures of FAR § 9.4 
governing the debarment, suspension, and ineligibility of contractors, by not allowing 
them an “opportunity to appear with counsel, submit documentary evidence, present 
witnesses, and confront any person the agency presents” (FAR § 9.406(3) Debarment 
Procedures), the U.S. government infringes on Fifth Amendment protection against 
unfair treatment in legal processes; this in turn evokes procedural due process rights 
protection from arbitrary denial of life, liberty, or property. COFC recognizes this 
infringement by the U.S. government and the right to be heard. “Due process normally 
requires that a contractor receive notice of the charges impugning its integrity and an 
opportunity to be heard” (MG Altus Apache Company v. United States, 2013). 
However, the court ascertains due process requirements are dependent on given 
circumstances and “Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as 
the particular situation demands and basic elements of due process such as notice, 
grounds, opportunity to respond and be heard are subject to essential national security 
considerations” (MG Altus Apache Company v. United States, 2013).  
Therefore the court reasonably judged by 
providing a contractor either notice of its ineligible status or an 
opportunity to present rebuttal evidence, requiring traditional due process 
in the CJ2X rating process would adversely affect national security. In the 
environment of a warzone when the required notice would necessarily 
disclose classified material and could compromise national security, 
normal due process requirements must give way to national security 
concerns. Not only would affording due process here require disclosure of 
classified information and endanger military intelligence sources, it would 
provide information to entities that pose a potential threat to the United 
States, thereby placing United States forces and operations at risk. (MG 
Altus Apache Company v. United States, 2013)  
MG AA was not deprived due process rights. The KO was not obligated to notify 
MG AA of a rejected status because the KO determined MG AA not be the only apparent 
successful offeror based on past performance factors under the MG EMA joint venture 
57 
HNT contract. It is reasonable that the vendor vetting process further demonstrated MG 
AA’s lack of ethics and integrity. MG AA failed to show clear and convincing evidence 
that it was arbitrarily excluded from competition or that the KO acted in bad faith and 
demonstrated a “systematic effort by the procuring agency to reject all of the bidder’s 
contract bids” (MG Altus Apache Company v. United States, 2013). MG AA was given 
an opportunity to respond and did not contest CJ2X’s assessment as inaccurate, nor did 
MG AA justify proper corrective actions to prevent future performance deficiencies. It is 
not that MG AA was blacklisted from contract awards, but it was found nonresponsible 
by its lack of information as per FAR § 9.104(b)(3) Application of Standards: “Past 
failure to apply sufficient tenacity and perseverance to perform acceptably is strong 
evidence of nonresponsibility.” 
f. Conclusion
The Judge ruled in favor of the KO. The plaintiff’s motion for judgment on 
Permanent Injunction was denied. “The FAR does not require that each of the contracting 
officer’s conclusions be independently sufficient on its own to support a finding of 
nonresponsibility. Rather, the contracting officer’s nonresponsibility determination as a 
whole must be rational (MG Altus Apache Company v. United States, 2013). “The Court 
notes that, on the whole, the evidence on which the contracting officer relied to find MG 
AA nonresponsible was sufficient to support a conclusion that the contracting officer’s 
judgment call was reasonable” (MG Altus Apache Company v. United States, 2013). 
g. Summary
(1) What decision is being made? 
• Was the KO’s responsibility determination arbitrary?
• Is relying on a partner’s past performance from a joint venture
unreasonable when evaluating the KTR’s past performance?
• Was using the vendor vetting assessment rating as the basis for the
responsibility determination injudicious?
• Does the vendor vetting procedures operate as a de facto debarment
process, thus denying due process rights?
(2) Who is responsible for making the decision? 
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In a protest case, the Court of Federal Claims (COFC) has jurisdiction to review 
the Department of the Army’s (the agency) procurement decision under the standards 
articulated within the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 
The COFC is authorized to set aside any agency action that is arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law 
and illegal. An agency action is arbitrary and capricious under the APA 
when the agency entirely fails to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offers an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the 
evidence before the agency, or the decision is so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), an agency must examine 
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, 
including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made. (MG Altus Apache Company v. United States, 2013) 
(3) What standard of evidence is necessary to make a decision? 
MG AA failed to show clear and convincing evidence that it was arbitrarily 
excluded from competition or that the KO acted in bad faith. The KO demonstrated with 
a preponderance of evidence that past performance systemic behavior patterns resulted in 
significant doubt of responsibility for future services, according to FAR § 9.104(b)(3) 
Application of Standards: “Past failure to apply sufficient tenacity and perseverance to 
perform acceptably is strong evidence of nonresponsibility” (2015). 
(4) Upon whom does the burden of proof reside? 
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the responsibility determination 
was arbitrary and capricious. The protestor also bears the burden of proof in 
demonstrating an agency procurement process error. A protester alleging bad faith bears 
a heavy burden of proof to establish its claim with clear and convincing evidence 
(requiring the contractor to make a showing of clear and convincing evidence to support 
the claim that the agency did not act in good faith (MG Altus Apache Company v. United 
States, 2013). MG AA did not contest CJ2X’s assessment in several areas, nor did MG 
AA refute the KO’s determination that CJ2X’s assessment substantiates MG AA’s lack 
of ethics and integrity. MG AA failed to show evidence for which the KO relied on 
CJ2X’s the intelligence assessment as inaccurate. 
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(5) What risk is inherent in this decision? 
COFC reasons that a claim of de facto debarment as grounds for protest can be 
presented before the court for relief or remedy even if the KTR is determined “high risk,” 
therefore giving the enemy potential due process rights and a liberty interest to enter into 
U.S. government contracts. This would consistently call into question the KO’s discretion 
and authority. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the KO must articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for his action, including a rational connection between the facts 
found and the choice made (5 U.S.C.A. § 706) relevant to the contractor qualifications 
and standards outlined in FAR § 9.104-1. This could potentially become an overall 
burdensome process on the shoulders of the KO every time a contract is terminated or 
make a nonresponsibility determination based upon the vendor vetting assessment and 
rating. 
It is advisable that the KO demonstrate a logical and rational connection between 
the facts found and the decisions it makes. The KO must provide a potential contractor a 
formal notice and an opportunity to respond with corrective actions, unless otherwise 
ordered in the interests of national security. The KO must consider if the experience 
evaluated can reasonably be considered predictive of the KTR’s performance under the 
solicited contract when making a determination. Or, in the absence of information, a clear 
indication that the prospective contractor is responsible, the contracting officer shall 
make a determination of nonresponsibility. “Contracting officers are generally given 
wide discretion in making responsibility determinations and in determining the amount of 
information that is required to make a responsibility determination; when such decisions 
have a rational basis and are supported by the record, they will be upheld” (MG Altus 
Apache Company v. United States, 2013), but if the protestor presents clear and 
convincing evidence supporting his or her claim and the COFC determines their evidence 
as factual matter, the COFC would recognize the protestor as being prejudiced by such 
standard business process errors and grant the protestor relief or remedy in which the KO 
is legally obligated to abide by. 
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4. El-Shiffa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. & Idris v. The United States,
2004 
a. Topic
Status designation; Fifth Amendment rights 
An overview of El-Shiffa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. & Idris v. The United 
States (2004) is summarized in Table 7 for quick reference. 
Table 7.   Overview of El-Shiffa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. & Idris v. 
The United States (2004) 
b. Context
This case was presented in the Court of Federal Claims in 2004 as an appeal to a 
previous decision. Collective appellants El-Shiffa Pharmaceutical Industries Company 
and Salah El Din Ahmed Mohammed Idris brought a suit against the United States 
seeking just compensation of $50 million dollars for the destruction of the pharmaceutical 
manufacturing plant located in Sudan, Africa by U.S. Armed Forces. The appellants 
Appellant Defendant
Issue Challenged the government’s designation of a 
pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, Africa as enemy 
property. Advocated to the court that the president 
relied on flawed intelligence for targeting regarding the 
production of chemical weapons and any links to al-
Qaeda. El Shiffa et al. claim they are entitled to relief in 
the form of just compensation based upon the Takings 
Clause.
Appellants had no legal standing to sue as nonresident 
aliens; There is no substantial voluntary connection 
between the United States the appellants, nor their 
property; and There is no legal reciprocity with Sudan. 
The Takings Clause does not apply to nonresident 
aliens, nor their property that is located beyond U.S. 
territory on foreign soil, because there is no substantial 




Fifth Amendment – Takings Clause; Reciprocity Act; Nonjusticiable Political Question Doctrine
Due to the nature of the surrounding circumstances, this Taking’s claim is a nonjusticiable political question and 
upholds that the Takings Clause does not protect the interests of nonresident aliens whose property is located in 
a foreign country unless they can demonstrate substantial voluntary connections to the United States. Defining the 
standard of evidence as convincing or compelling in order to make an enemy designation is up to the president to 
determine, not the courts.
Providing additional due process to contest an enemy designation is not worth risking the possibility that such 
decisions the President makes in waging war successfully overseas will analogously be subjected to review by the 
federal courts. The appellant’s failed to demonstrate a substantial voluntary connection to the United States, just 
compensation does not apply to enemy property, and, therefore, their request of just compensation was denied.
El-Shiffa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. & Idris v. The United States (2004)
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allege that El-Shiffa pharmaceutical manufacturing company was the largest in Sudan 
and it was supplying drugs to help the poor. 
Terrorist networks linked to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda bombed U.S. 
Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Tanzania on August 7, 1998. On August 20, 1998, 
President Clinton ordered strikes in Sudan to disrupt the terrorist networks and destroy a 
plant known to manufacture chemical weapons. The president stated the following in his 
letter to Congress: 
The United States had acted in self-defense, and that the strikes were a 
necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further 
terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities. These strikes were 
intended to prevent and deter additional attacks by a clearly identified 
terrorist threat. The targets were selected because they served to facilitate 
directly the efforts of terrorists specifically identified with attacks on U.S. 
personnel and facilities and posed a continuing threat to U.S. lives. The 
President added that he ordered the strikes pursuant to his constitutional 
authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander and Chief 
Executive. (El-Shiffa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. & Idris v. The United 
States, 2004) 
El-Shifa and Mr. Idris denied the asserted accusations by the Clinton 
Administration regarding the production of chemical weapons in the pharmaceutical plant 
and any links to al-Qaeda. The U.S. government responded with a request to dismiss the 
case because the appellants had no legal standing to sue as nonresident aliens; there is no 
substantial voluntary connection between the United States, the appellants, nor their 
property; and there is no legal reciprocity with Sudan. 
c. Issue
The appellants claim they are entitled to relief in the form of just compensation 
based upon the Takings Clause: 
The Takings Clause imposes an absolute and unqualified restriction upon 
government conduct... [that] is derived from a theory of ‘natural law’ and 
based upon a natural right to private property which is universal in nature, 
not dependent on citizenship, and a fundamental principle of international 
law. (El-Shiffa et al. v. The United States, 2004) 
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The U.S. government argues that the Takings Clause does not apply to 
nonresident aliens, nor their property that is located beyond U.S. territory on foreign soil, 
because there is no substantial voluntary connection with the United States. 
d. Rule
The Takings Clause, Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires 
the government to pay just compensation at fair market value for private 
property that the federal government acquires for use. If the government 
appropriates property without paying just compensation, a plaintiff may 
sue in the Court of Federal Claims on a takings claim regardless of 
whether the government’s conduct leading to the taking was wrongful, and 
regardless of whether the plaintiff could have challenged the government’s 
conduct as wrongful in another forum. (El-Shiffa et al. v. The United 
States, 2004) 
The Reciprocity Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2502 (2014), states Citizens or subjects of any 
foreign government which accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute 
claims against their government in its courts may sue the United States in the United 
States Court of Federal Claims if the subject matter of the suit is otherwise within such 
court’s jurisdiction.  
The Enemy Property Doctrine acknowledges that enemy-declared property and 
the destruction of such property does not require the U.S. government to make 
reparations or just compensation. 
The Nonjusticiable Political Question/Political Question Doctrine is a ruling by 
the Supreme Court in which that federal courts should not hear cases that are directly 
involved with issues that the U.S. Constitution makes the sole responsibility of the other 
government branches. 
e. Application
The court realizes that the text of the Takings Clause does not define what private 
property is, nor if the property must be located within the United States, or if only 
American citizens may receive just compensation. Both parties agree that a takings claim 
can be valid if the property is not physically located within the United States (Turney v. 
U.S. (1953) rejects the argument that Takings Clause did not apply to property located in 
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a foreign country) and a claimant does not have to be a U.S. citizen or a resident alien for 
a valid takings claim if the property is within the United States. The disagreement is in 
the facts, whereas the claimant in this case is a nonresident alien with property on foreign 
soil in which there is no substantial voluntary connection with the United States. A 
Supreme Court’s decision (U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 1990) established that aliens are 
entitled to receive constitutional protections when they are within U.S. territories and 
have developed substantial connections. However, Turney v. U.S. (1953) binds the U.S. 
government, as the Takings Clause protects the property interests of nonresident aliens 
abroad even if no substantial connection can be demonstrated. The court realizes that due 
to the nature of the surrounding circumstances, the taking’s claim is a nonjusticiable 
political question and is not required to uphold the Turney ruling of 1953, but upholds the 
Supreme Court’s ruling of Verdugo-Urquidez, (1990) and determines “that the Takings 
Clause does not protect the interests of nonresident aliens whose property is located in a 
foreign country unless they can demonstrate substantial voluntary connections to the 
United States” (El-Shiffa et al. v. The United States, 2004). The appellants did not 
contend but conceded to the fact that just compensation does not apply to enemy 
property, therefore they challenged the government’s designation of the pharmaceutical 
plant as enemy property and advocated to the court that the president relied on flawed 
intelligence for targeting. 
The court reflects on Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution establishing judicial 
powers of U.S. Courts and states that Article III does not encompass judicial supervision 
over the president’s designation as enemies against the United States. Consequently, the 
status determination challenge becomes a nonjusticiable political question. Baker v. Carr, 
(1962) ruled that the conduct of foreign relations is the sole responsibility of the 
executive branch and any issue or challenge in the way that the executive branch is using 
its constitutional power presents a political question. The U.S. Constitution authorizes the 
president to act as the Commander-in-Chief and direct the performance of military 
functions by the U.S. military in which within these functions are tasks that are important 
during the conduct of war. The court states,  
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In our view, the President’s power to wage war must also necessarily 
include the power to make extraterritorial enemy designations because 
such designations are also an important incident to the conduct of war and 
cannot envision how a military commander, much less the Commander-in-
Chief, could wage war successfully if he did not have the inherent power 
to decide what to target. We are of the opinion that the federal courts have 
no role in setting even minimal standards by which the President, or his 
commanders, are to measure the veracity of intelligence gathered with the 
aim of determining which assets, located beyond the shores of the United 
States, belong to the Nation’s friends and which belong to its enemies. (El-
Shiffa et al. v. The United States, 2004) 
The court adds some definition to the measure of veracity as defining the standard 
of evidence as convincing or compelling in order to make an enemy designation, which is 
up to the president to determine, not the courts. Moreover, the Supreme Court states, 
It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field 
commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to 
submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his 
efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal 
defensive at home. 
The appellants’ desire for judicial review of the President’s decision to 
target the Plant would most surely give way to the specter of field 
commanders vetting before the civil courts the intelligence on which they 
rely in selecting targets for destruction while simultaneously dealing with 
the exigencies of waging war on the battlefield. For all of these reasons, 
we think the Constitution, in its text and by its structure, commits to the 
President the power to make enemy designations such as the one made 
regarding the appellants’ Plant. (El-Shiffa et al. v. The United States, 
2004) 
f. Conclusion
The court describes a Mathews test in which the Supreme Court uses to balance 
the interests of the U.S. government to that of an individual. The Mathews test ensures a 
citizen is not deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process. 
The application of the Mathews test would require us to balance the 
appellants’ strong interest in not being deprived of their property interest 
in the Plant without due process against the President’s interest and 
capacity to wage war overseas. In other words, we would have to consider 
whether providing the appellants additional process to contest the single 
enemy property designation at bar is worth risking the possibility that the 
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panoply of such decisions the President makes in waging war successfully 
overseas will likewise be subjected to review in the federal courts. In 
short, we think the question answers itself. The balance, in this case, must 
necessarily tip in the President’s favor. (El-Shiffa et al. v. The United 
States, 2004)  
g. Summary
(1) What decision is being made? 
• Are nonresident aliens entitled to Fifth Amendment protection rights?
• Are enemy designations by the president or military combatant
commander’s under presidential authority subject to judicial review during
time of war?
(2) Who is responsible for making the decision? 
The president is authorized by his constitutional war powers to make an enemy 
designation decision. This decision is extended to the military geographic combatant 
commanders through the National Command Authority that refers to the lawful source of 
military orders. 
(3) What standard of evidence is necessary to make the decision? 
The court describes the standard of evidence as compelling or convincing for an 
enemy designation, but because of the political question doctrine, the challenge to the 
designation is not under judicial review because the president acted upon his 
constitutional war powers to defend the nation.  
(4) Upon whom does the burden of proof reside? 
The burden of proof resides on the claimant or appellant in this case to prove 
there is a substantial voluntary connection, and that the countries of Sudan practices legal 
reciprocity with equal treatment without undue influence (such as Islamic fundamental 
laws) with the United States to have a valid taking’s claim. Nonetheless, all evidence is 
void by an enemy designation. 
(5) What risk is inherent in the decision(s)? 
The court acknowledges the appellant’s challenges, even under enemy status. 
Although the U.S. government’s interests outweigh the appellant’s interests in this case, 
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the court still provides an opportunity to be heard and evaluated as to extending fifth 
amendment rights to the private party or not.  
5. Ralls Corporation v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States, 2014
a. Topic
Due process; Access to classified information; Enemy designation 
An overview of Ralls Corporation v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (CFIUS) (2014) is summarized in Table 8 for quick reference. 
Table 8.   Overview of Ralls Corporation v. CFIUS (2014) 
Plaintiff Defendant
Issue Protested CIFUS’s investigation and Presidential Order 
violated the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Ralls was never provided the opportunity to review and 
respond to the evidence in which CFIUS and the president 
used to make a determination. Ralls was never informed of 
the gravity of concern by CFIUS nor was any information 
ever disclosed to Ralls in order to mitigate those concerns to 
the U.S. government.
The Ralls acquisition threatened national security interests due 
to certain locations of the wind farms being in military 
restricted areas. The U.S. government argued that Ralls’s 
due process challenge is a nonjusticiable political question. 
Ralls received adequate process with the opportunity to 
present evidence in Ralls’s favor under which Ralls was 
notified that its transaction was subject to review. Because of 
the national security interests by the executive branch, no 
further process was due.
Rule
Decision The Presidential Order deprived Ralls of their constitutionally protected property interests without due process of law. 
Because Ralls had the opportunity to present evidence to CFIUS and to interact with it, then, is plainly not enough to satisfy 
due process because Ralls never had the opportunity to tailor its submission to the U.S. government’s concerns or rebut the 
factual premises underlying the President’s action.
 Ralls Corporation v. CFIUS  (2014)
Nonjusticiable policical question doctrine; Fifth Amendment—Due Process Clause
Application The judiciary branch does not have neither the aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility to review national security decisions 
made by the executive branch, therefore, to what standards of evidence or findings to determine if an entity threatens 
national security becomes a nonjusticiable political question.
Ralls possessed state law property interests when it acquired the companies and their assets before CFIUS’s investigation 
whereas valid contracts are considered property under the Fifth Amendment. Because state law recognizes the property 
interest, the protections of the Due Process Clause should be provided. The question becomes how much process is due?
Due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time but flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands. The court makes a strong point that due process does not require disclosure 
of classified information supporting official action. Due process requires that an affected party be informed of the official 
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b. Context
This case was heard on an appeal May 5, 2014 in the Court of Appeals, District of 
Columbia Circuit Court. The appellant, Ralls Corporation, purchased four wind farm 
companies that were American owned to develop wind farms in north-central Oregon. 
Ralls is an American company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Georgia 
but owned by two Chinese nationals, Dawei Duan and Jialiang Wu, who assert that 
Ralls’s is in the business of identifying U.S. opportunities for the 
construction of wind farms in which the wind turbines of Sany Electric 
[Chinese windmill manufacture with direct ties to Duan and Wu], its 
affiliate, can be used and their quality and reliability demonstrated to the 
U.S. wind industry in comparison to competitor products. (Ralls 
Corporation v. CFIUS, 2014)  
The acquisition of the four American wind farm companies came under scrutiny 
from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) which reviews 
any transaction that could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate 
commerce in the United States. Because Chinese nationals own the Ralls Corporation, 
CFIUS determined, after an investigation, that the acquisition by Ralls threatened 
national security interests due to certain location of the wind farms being in military 
restricted areas. CIFUS forwarded the investigation to the president, who issued a 
presidential order that prohibited Ralls’s acquisition of the American owned companies. 
c. Issue
Ralls protests that the investigation and Presidential Order violated the Due 
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment because Ralls was never provided the opportunity 
to review and respond to the evidence in which CFIUS and the president used to make 
their determination. Ralls claims it was never informed of the gravity of concern by 
CFIUS with the transaction at any time, nor was any information ever disclosed to Ralls 
in order to mitigate those concerns to the U.S. government. 
Neither the July Order nor the CFIUS Order disclosed the nature of the 
national security threat the transaction posed or the evidence on which 
CFIUS relied in issuing the orders. On September 28, 2012, the President 
issued an Order regarding the acquisition of four U.S. Wind Farm Project 
Companies by Ralls Corporation stating there is credible evidence that 
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leads [the President] to believe that Ralls might take action that threatens 
to impair the national security of the United States. (Ralls Corporation v. 
CFIUS, 2014) 
It is undisputed, and both parties concede, that neither CFIUS nor the president 
gave Ralls notice of evidence in which the determination was based upon, nor the 
opportunity to respond and rebut such evidence. 
d. Rule
Due Process Clause requires the government to respect all rights, 
guarantees, and protections for all U.S. citizens afforded by the U.S. 
Constitution before the government can deprive a person of life, liberty, or 
property. Due process essentially guarantees that a party will receive a 
fundamentally fair, orderly, and just judicial proceeding. Procedural due 
process aims to ensure fundamental fairness by guaranteeing a party the 
right to be heard, ensuring that the parties receive proper notification 
throughout the litigation, and ensures that the adjudicating court has the 
appropriate jurisdiction to render a judgment. (LII, 2015) 
Nonjusticiable Political Question/Political Question Doctrine is a ruling by the 
Supreme Court in which that federal courts should not hear cases that are directly 
involved with issues that the U.S. Constitution makes the sole responsibility of the other 
government branches to make. 
e. Application
The U.S. government responds to the denial of due process claim by offering to 
the court several applications of constitutional claims and their application under several 
circumstances. The U.S. government infers, from legislative history that under current 
statute authority of the president to declare determinations, any review of presidential 
actions are to occur in Congress and not by judiciary courtrooms. The court finds no clear 
and convincing evidence through legislative history that the intended authority given to 
the president, and presidential actions subject to review by Congress, intended to 
preclude or withhold a judicial forum where constitutional due process claims are to be 
heard.  
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The U.S. government argues that Ralls’s due process challenge is a nonjusticiable 
political question as described during the El-Shiffa v. U.S. (2004) case whereas 
such decisions entrusted to the executive branch are not subject to judicial 
review of discovery or establishment of manageable standards for 
resolution. The court assesses if a discriminating analysis of the particular 
question posed in the specific case before the court to determine whether 
the political question prevents a claim from going forward and quotes 
from El-Shiffa v. U.S. (2004) that the judiciary is the ultimate interpreter 
of the Constitution and in most instances, claims alleging its violation will 
rightly be heard by the courts. (Ralls Corporation v. CFIUS, 2014)  
The court applies an analogy to the Secretary of State’s Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO) designation by illustrating three criteria to establish a distinction 
between a justiciable legal challenge and a nonjusticiable political question. The 
Secretary of State may designate an entity as a FTO if the organization is foreign, the 
organization engages in a terrorist activity, and that terrorist activity of the foreign 
organization threatens the national security of the United States. The court determines 
that the first two statutory criteria are judicially reviewable, but outside the jurisdiction of 
the court is the review of what the secretary’s findings were that determines the 
organization to threaten national security because the question involves foreign policy 
and national security decisions by the executive branch in which the judiciary branch has 
“neither the aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility” (Ralls Corporation v. CFIUS, 2014) to 
make, and therefore upon what standards of evidence or finding to determine if an entity 
threatens national security becomes a nonjusticiable political question. Ralls does not 
challenge the claim of a nonjusticiable question is to be reviewed or not but challenges 
the Due Process Clause in which they are entitled to have notice and access to the 
information and evidence on which the president relied upon to make a nonjusticiable 
determination and have an opportunity to respond and rebut if applicable. 
There is no dispute that Ralls possessed state law property interests when it 
acquired the companies and their assets before CFIUS’s investigation whereas valid 
contracts are considered property under the Fifth Amendment. Because state law 
recognizes the property interest, the protections of the Due Process Clause should be 
provided. However, the government argues that because Ralls’s acquisition was known to 
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Ralls as a subject to the risk of presidential veto and waived the opportunity to obtain a 
determination from CFIUS and the president before finalizing the acquisition, Ralls’s 
property interests are waived from constitutional protections. The court responds with 
stating that Ralls’s property interests were not waived because the acquisition was 
contingent until approved by the federal government because the federal government 
cannot evade due process protections afforded to state property by “simply announcing 
future deprivations of property may be forthcoming. What the court questions is what 
process is due?” (Ralls Corporation v. CFIUS, 2014) The court defines due process as the 
following: 
Unlike some legal rules, due process is not a technical conception with a 
fixed content unrelated to time but flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands. Due process ordinarily 
requires that procedures provide notice of the proposed official action and 
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner. Those procedures, which have been held to satisfy the Due 
Process Clause, have included notice of the action sought, along with the 
opportunity to effectively be heard. Both the Supreme Court and this 
Court have recognized that the right to know the factual basis for the 
action and the opportunity to rebut the evidence supporting that action are 
essential components of due process. (Ralls Corporation v. CFIUS, 2014) 
However, the court makes a strong point that due process does not require 
disclosure of classified information supporting official action and “classified information 
is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive, and do not intend to compel a 
breach in the security which that branch is charged to protect” (Ralls Corporation v. 
CFIUS, 2014). The government argues that Ralls received adequate process with the 
opportunity to present evidence in Ralls’s favor under which Ralls was notified that its 
transaction was subject to review. Because of the national security interests by the 
executive branch, no further process was due. 
f. Conclusion
The court concluded the following: 
The Presidential Order deprived Ralls of its constitutionally protected 
property interests without due process of law. As the preceding discussion 
makes plain, due process requires, at the least, that an affected party be 
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informed of the official action, be given access to the unclassified 
evidence on which the official actor relied and be afforded an opportunity 
to rebut that evidence. Because Ralls had the opportunity to present 
evidence to CFIUS and to interact with it, then, is plainly not enough to 
satisfy due process because Ralls never had the opportunity to tailor its 
submission to the Appellees’ concerns or rebut the factual premises 
underlying the President’s action. (Ralls Corporation v. CFIUS, 2014) 
g. Summary
(1) What decision is being made? 
• What processes are due which are constitutionally protected?
• What type of information must be made available in order to address a
concern and provide an opportunity to respond?
• Who is responsible for making the decision?
The court determines that because the order violated due process does not mean 
that presidential decisions are subject to disclosure relative to his discretion and national 
security interests. The decision-making process should provide access to unclassified 
material for the respondent to address because only after a compiled record review will 
the president make a determination, thus allowing for due process. 
(2) What standard of evidence is necessary to make the decision? 
In this case, the standard of evidence is clear and convincing that the appellants 
had state property interests which afforded them constitutional protection rights under the 
Fifth Amendment. What is not clear is the standard of evidence in which CFIUS and the 
president used to determine a national security threat, nor is it subject to review, but 
implied that in good faith clear and convincing evidence is the standard on which a 
determination is made. 
(3) Upon whom does the burden of proof reside? 
The burden of proof resides on the claimant or party subject to review to provide 
clear and convincing evidence asserting factual statements for which the reviewing party 
can make a conclusion and determination. Due process is given when notification and the 
opportunity to respond is given with access to unclassified information in order to 
address the concerned. 
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(4) What risk is inherent in the decision(s)? 
The risk in this decision requires notification and release of unclassified 
information even when national security interests are at stake if the defending party is 
entitled to constitutional protections. This does not call into question the authority or 
discretion to make a determination but the notification of review. Such notifications 
could effectively undermine the purpose of the investigations or ultimately increase the 
relevant associated risks. 
6. Case Review Conclusion
Overwhelmingly, the burden of proof resides on the claimants to provide clear 
and convincing evidence supporting their argument. The defendant, typically the U.S. 
government, government official, or contracting officer has the burden of persuasion to 
demonstrate their actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of their discretion. 
Key is an articulation of a satisfactory explanation for their actions, including a rational 
connection between the facts and the choices made under an evaluation as a whole. The 
court describes the public trust under which the executive branch and military decisions 
are made to make status determinations, and as such are outside the scope of the court 
with regards to foreign policy, military operations, and national security. 
Due process ordinarily requires that procedures provide notice of the 
proposed official action and the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner. Those procedures, which have been 
held to satisfy the Due Process Clause, have included notice of the action 
sought, along with the opportunity to effectively be heard. Both the 
Supreme Court and the Court [Court of Appeals] have recognized that the 
right to know the factual basis for the action and the opportunity to rebut 
the evidence supporting that action are essential components of due 
process. (Ralls Corporation v. CFIUS, 2014)  
But, 
Due process is also observed as flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands, whereas in the 
environment of a warzone when the required notice would necessarily 
disclose classified material and could compromise national security, 
normal due process requirements must give way to national security 
concerns. Not only would affording due process here require disclosure of 
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classified information and endanger military intelligence sources, it would 
provide information to entities that pose a potential threat to the United 
States, thereby placing United States forces and operations at risk.  (MG 
Altus Apache Company v. United States, 2013) 
The common risk associated with these cases is the acceptance by the courts for 
the plaintiffs to bring forward their claims and be heard. Even though the rulings of the 
court are similar in so far as to protect our national security, the court offers the right to 
be heard post-facto of any such action. By observing this, a question of life, liberty, or 
property interests may act as an enemy protection. Does such Fifth Amendment interests 
extend to enemy status personnel by way of entering into a contract with the U.S. 
government? Does a U.S. government contract demonstrate a substantial voluntary 
connection with the United States resulting in Constitutional protections and entitlement 
to Fifth Amendment rights? If so, those entities that may operate as enemies to the U.S. 
government or affiliated with the enemy have an interest to enter into a contract with the 
U.S. government because of the protections the Constitution affords. At a minimum, it is 
demonstrated that an enemy or those entities affiliated with an enemy will have the 
opportunity to bring their case forward and be heard in federal court. Albeit, the burden 
of evidence is on the claimant to clearly prove a substantial voluntary connection, the 
Fifth Amendment recognizes contracts as property. As such, the court will call forward 
our government officials during a time of war that will untimely take undo focus off of 
the mission at hand, create a burden onto the official, and ultimately degrade warfighter 
support. The KO must demonstrate systematic past performance patterns to support a 
satisfactory explanation and rational connection between the facts, as a whole, for a 
nonresponsibility determination. 
E. CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF POLICY, PROCESSES, AND CASE LAW 
The U.S. government has a bon fide interest in preventing contracting with the 
enemy. Unfortunately, the tools available to government officials right now are overly 
burdensome and subject to judicial scrutiny when they result in a due process deprivation 
and or de facto debarment. Additionally, the evidentiary standards necessary to suspend 
and debar contractors for a period of time require evidentiary standards that are more 
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severe than current government policy for the lethal targeting of U.S. citizens abroad who 
are involved in terrorist organizations. As a result, the government has relied on 
contracting officers to execute prudent responsibility determinations to prevent enemy-
affiliated contractors from competing for awards in Afghanistan. The MG AA case 
indicates that contracting officers must execute thorough due diligence prior to providing 
a nonresponsibility determination for a prospective contractor. Furthermore, they must 
thoroughly document their justifications for the nonresponsibility determination in the 
contract file as it may be challenged in the COFC if the determination resulted in de facto 
debarment. While the COFC has ruled in favor of the U.S. government’s interests in de 
facto debarment cases resulting from contracting-with-the-enemy scenarios, the 
contracting officer must execute the somewhat burdensome step of performing due 
diligence for the nonresponsibility determination. That extra effort, may result in 
extended PALT times for critical services in contingency environments as contracting 
officers must thoroughly analyze potential prime contractors and their sub-contractors for 
evidence of enemy affiliations. Although current policy and practices are burdensome, 
the case law we reviewed suggests that there is potential for reform. 
The existing case law we reviewed provide strong precedence for discretion 
within executive branch agencies when contracting with or targeting enemy agents or 
organizations during a period of war or hostility. First, the Filor case establishes a 
historical precedence that allows the U.S. government to void and terminate contracts 
with enemy-affiliated businesses. In the El-Shiffa case, the court upheld the executive 
branches discretion to destroy enemy property overseas. In the Al-Aulaqi case, the 
executive branches decision to lethally target a U.S. citizen who was a senior leader in 
AQAP was upheld as the court determined due process rights are flexible in nature and 
can be waived in favor of national security interests. Finally, in the Ralls case, the court 
upheld the U.S. government’s decision not to disclose classified information to the 
plaintiff, therefore depriving them of full due process rights in the name of national 
security. While the current processes for preventing contracting with the enemy are 
complicated by the prospect of judicial review, the standing body of case law typically 
grants significant latitude for executive branch agencies to make decisions regarding 
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prospective contractors and the targeting of enemy property when significant national 
security interests are at stake. In the final chapter, we will conclude are study by 
reiterating the results of our research and identifying a policy recommendation aimed at 
better managing the enemy contractor predicament. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
Contracting-with-the-enemy represents an emerging and dynamic threat to U.S. 
contingency operations worldwide. Left unmitigated, enemy- affiliated contractors have 
the potential to cause grave harm to U.S. interests either financially or through greater 
access to U.S. facilities and personnel. Despite efforts to address the problem, the 
contracting officer is left facing a dilemma in which they must apply ill-suited 
contracting processes to effect a military decision. Occasionally, those contracting 
processes found in the FAR, are not strong enough to completely prevent an enemy-
affiliated contractor from competing on a contract. When that happens, the contracting 
officer may find their decision to prevent an enemy-affiliated contractor from competing 
for a contract challenged in the court of law. While the COFC has ruled in favor of the 
U.S. government’s interests in contracting with the enemy related cases to date, the fact 
that they are allowing the contractors to argue a due process claim suggests that 
contracting officers should be extremely diligent with the tools they use to limit 
competition. 
A. FINDINGS 
In this section, we provide the conclusive findings to our research. Our findings or 
organized in terms of our original research questions postulated in chapter one.  
• How can standard contracting processes like those authorized by the FAR
be used by contracting officers to prevent contracting with the enemy?
DOD uses the vendor vetting system to gather intelligence on and determine 
whether or not prospective contractors are in fact affiliated with enemy organizations. 
That process of discovery and determination of enemy-affiliated contractors occurs 
exclusively within the military chain of command in the various GCCs. Once a 
prospective contractor is determined to be affiliated with an enemy organization, the 
responsibility lies within the theater contracting chain of command to terminate, void, 
and prevent that contractor from contracting with the U.S. government. The tools 
available to contracting officers to do so are limited to those found in the FAR. In order 
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to prevent entering into a new contract with an enemy-affiliated contractor, contracting 
officials use responsibility determinations, suspension, and debarment. 
The responsibility determination is the primary means available to contracting 
officers to limit an enemy-affiliated contractor from competing for a contract. The 
responsibility determination decision is delegated to the individual contracting officer and 
does not typically afford due process rights to the affected contractor. Ideally, all of the 
contractors identified by the vendor vetting process would also be suspended and 
debarred. However, the Army has been reluctant to do that due to higher evidentiary 
standards and greater due process rights on behalf of the contractors. Therefore, 
contracting officers have resorted to repeated uses of nonresponsibility determinations to 
prevent prospective enemy-affiliated contractors from competing.  
• How do the evidentiary standards and burdens of proof required to prevent
an enemy-affiliated contractor form competing for a contract compare
with enemy status determinations including lethal targeting?
Our research suggests a wide disparity exists between the evidentiary standards 
and burden of proof associated with enemy status determinations and those same 
standards associated with the standard contracting processes found in the FAR. 
Specifically, the legal criteria used by the Obama administration to lethally target U.S. 
citizens who are senior leaders in terrorist organizations are significantly less strict than 
the legal criteria associated with debarment decisions. Moreover, the government’s 
authority to lethally target U.S. citizens who are senior leaders in terrorist organizations 
overseas was upheld in Al-Aulaqi et al. vs. Panetta et al. when the court ruled that 
national security interests outweighed Al-Aulaqi’s due process rights. Furthermore, the 
president’s authority to destroy the property of non-resident alien’s was upheld in El-
Shiffa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. & Idris v. The United States on the basis that the 
national security threat associated with El-Shiffa’s property justified a preemptive air 
strike. In conclusion, there are significantly more legal burdens associated with the 
application of standard contracting processes to prevent enemy contracting than there are 
with enemy status determinations to include lethal targeting. 
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• What conflicts are created when contracting officers use standard
contracting processes to exclude sources from competition in order to
achieve the military goal of preventing enemy businesses from competing
for contract award?
Preventing contracting-with-the-enemy is fundamentally a military goal. If an 
enemy-affiliated business is able to secure a contract with the U.S. government, they 
would might gain access to critical U.S. infrastructure as well as reaping the financial 
rewards of contract performance. Therefore, contracting officers must pursue all means 
available to prevent this from happening. Unfortunately, our research concludes that the 
current tools available to CCOs to prevent contracting with the enemy are ill suited. The 
standard contracting processes found in the FAR, like responsibility determinations and 
suspension and debarment proceedings, were designed to limit competition opportunities 
for contractors with poor track records of performance. In order to limit subjective 
nonresponsibility determinations and or suspension and debarment, both processes 
include checks and balances that afford some level of due process on behalf of the 
contractor while requiring the government to establish evidentiary cause for their use. In 
a war time environment where a potential enemy-affiliated contractor may be financially 
supporting an enemy entity or worst actively planning an attack against U.S. 
infrastructure themselves, the standard contracting processes do not sufficiently limit 
their opportunity for competition. 
The requirement for some form of due process on behalf of the contractor is 
further complicated in contracting-with-the-enemy situations when government officials 
rely on classified information to make their decisions. In the case of MG Altus Apache 
Company v. United States, the contracting officer made a nonresponsibility determination 
with the use of classified information provided through the CENTCOM vendor vetting 
program. The contractor challenged that decision in the COFC, claiming that the 
contracting officer’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. While the court ultimately 
sided on behalf of the government, the fact that they allowed the case to be tried implies 
that contracting officers must be exceptionally diligent when effecting a nonresponsibility 
determination based on information provided by the vendor vetting program.   
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Contracting-with-the-enemy is a very real threat that has the potential to cause 
grave physical and monetary harm to U.S. contingency operations. It is a risk that we are 
aware of and must act to mitigate. In order to do so though, we must depart from the 
standard contracting processes found in the FAR. Additionally, we must modify the 
relationships between military command authority and contracting authority in order to 
preserve our national security interests against the threat of contracting with the enemy. 
In the following recommendations, we provide specific guidance to policy 
makers to mitigate the contracting-with-the-enemy problem. 
(1) Recommendation #1: Modify the Vendor Vetting Program 
Figure 5 depicts a modified vendor vetting program that would grant GCCs the 
authority to deem enemy-affiliated contractors ineligible for contract award. Our 
recommendation would function very much like the current vendor vetting program in 
operation in Afghanistan previously depicted by Figure 4. However, our recommendation 
grants GCCs the authority to determine enemy-affiliated contractors to be ineligible for 
competition, instead of simply identifying enemy-affiliated contractors and referring 
them to the contract chain of command for action. FAR § 2.101 states that “ineligible 
means excluded from Government contracting (and subcontracting, if appropriate) 
pursuant to statutory, Executive order, or regulatory authority other than this regulation” 
(2015). We recommend that the authority to declare an enemy-affiliated contractor 
ineligible be granted to combatant commanders for use during declared contingency 
operations. 
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Figure 5.  Modified Vendor Vetting Program 
In our recommendation an intelligence analysis organization that functions like 
TF 2010 in Afghanistan would be responsible for identifying and conducting analysis of 
potential enemy-affiliated contractors operating within the joint force commands area of 
operations. Upon identification of a potential enemy-affiliated contractor, they would 
develop a targeting package and forward it to the joint force commander for review and 
concurrence. If the joint force commander determines that the enemy-affiliated contractor 
should be reviewed for ineligibility, they would forward their recommendation to the 
geographic combatant commander who has overarching responsibility for the 
contingency operation. The geographic combatant commander could then decide whether 
or not to deem the suspect contractor ineligible. If the GCC makes an ineligibility 
determination, that decision would then be routed through the HCA to the contracting 
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officer who would then make an attempt to notify the prospective contractor that they 
were deemed ineligible by the geographic combatant commander due to suspected 
affiliation with the enemy. We recommend that the notification not convey 
classified information to the contractor, but instead simply notify them that they have 
been deemed ineligible for future contract competition. Under or recommendation, 
the contractor would then be granted the option to appeal the decision to the 
geographic combatant commander, but the burden of proof to prove their innocence of 
enemy affiliation would be rest solely with the contractor. Any appeal requests from the 
contractor would then be forwarded from the contractor through the contracting officer 
and HCA back to the geographic combatant commander for decision.  
We recognize that granting greater authority to the military chain of command 
vice the contracting line of authority is controversial. However, the ultimate 
responsibility for identifying and mitigating risk within a contingency environment rests 
with the military chain of command. Since contracting-with-the-enemy poses a grave risk 
that transcends typical contracting risks, we feel it is necessary for the military chain of 
command to assume full responsibility for the restriction of enemy-affiliated contractors. 
We find that the body of court precedence supports our recommendation as well. 
James Filor et al. v. The United States first established the legal precedence for the U.S. 
Government to deem enemy-affiliated businesses as ineligible for payment. More recent 
cases have upheld the U.S. Government’s right to waive or limit due process rights in the 
name of national security interests even when individual persons are lethally targeted like 
in the case of Al-Aulaqi et al. v. Panetta et al. Therefore, we believe that the national 
security interests at stake outweigh the right to full due process for enemy-affiliated 
contractors. 
(2) Recommendation #2: DPAP Issues Policy Letter Directing Use of 
Modified Vendor Vetting Program 
The office for Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) has the 
authority to issue class deviations to the DFARS. They routinely do so in order to issue 
new directives and clarifying guidance specific to DOD acquisition officials. The director 
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of DPAP must issue a signed memorandum declaring a class deviation to the DFARS 
directing all geographic combatant commands to establish a modified vendor vetting 
program granting combatant commanders the authority to declare enemy-affiliated 
contractors ineligible. This deviation should specify that the modified vendor vetting 
program would only grant combatant commanders the authority to deem contractors 
eligible for contracts that are directly related to an ongoing declared contingency 
operation. 
(3) Recommendation #3: Congress Includes a Policy Rider in FY 2016 
NDAA Authorizing Modified Vendor Vetting Program 
Congress routinely includes policy riders pertinent to contingency contracting 
operations in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The upcoming FY 2016 
NDAA provides a unique opportunity for members of congress to direct the 
implementation of our modified vendor vetting program. This act of congress would 
codify the authority for geographic combatant commanders to deem enemy-affiliated 
contractors ineligible. 
(4) Recommendation #4: Review Current Operational Practices for 
Areas of Improvement 
To immediately address the problem of contracting with the enemy, all 
contingency contracting organizations within the DOD should conduct an internal review 
of current operational practices. The review should focus on actions taken by contingency 
contracting officers to screen for enemy-affiliated contractors and eliminate them from 
competition. More specifically, contingency contracting officers must be aware of the 
need to thoroughly document all nonresponsibility determinations involving suspected 
enemy-affiliated contractors.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Areas for further research include, but are not limited to the following: 
• An analysis of the classified material from Iraq and Afghanistan pertinent
to the contracting-with-the-enemy topic. That study could review
classified contracting files from Iraq and Afghanistan or conduct
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interviews of past contingency contracting officers affected by enemy-
affiliated contractors. 
• An analysis of the contracting officer’s role in the The U.S. Army
Operating Concept. Specifically, how can contingency contracting 
officer’s assist the joint force commander’s goal of creating multiple 
dilemmas for enemy forces on tomorrow’s battlefield. 
• An analysis of the potential capacity for geographic combatant commands
to assume the added responsibility of making ineligibility determinations 
of potential enemy-affiliated contractors. 
• A comparison of the standard contract processes mentioned in this study
with the legal standards associated with military tribunals and 
commissions. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we conducted a comprehensive analysis of the contracting-with-the-
enemy phenomenon and related legal cases. As a result of our study, we concluded that 
the typical tools available to contracting officers to prevent enemy-affiliated contractors 
from competing on future contracts are the responsibility determination and suspension 
and debarment. However, those tools are ill suited for dealing with enemy-affiliated 
contractors because they allow for due process on behalf of the contractor. We conclude 
that the potential risk of enemy-affiliated contractors greatly outweighs the government’s 
requirement to extend full due process rights. Therefore, we proposed a recommendation 
that would give geographic combatant commanders the authority to deem enemy-
affiliated contractors ineligible. While this recommendation could not possibly mitigate 
every instance of businesses or individuals who want to simultaneously do business with 
and harm the U.S. Government interests, we feel it would represent a substantial 
improvement on current practices.  
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